Title

Employee equity incentives and venture capitalist involvement : Examining the effects on IPO performance.

SelectedWorks Author Profiles:

Scott Geiger

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2008

Date Issued

January 2008

Date Available

August 2011

Abstract

We examine the effects of venture capitalist involvement and equity incentives for all employees on the performance of initial public offering firms . Data was collected from 402 IPO firms, representing 242 non-VC backed and 160 VC backed firms. Results indicate venture capitalists positively influence the likelihood the portfolio firm will offer equity incentives to all employees. Consistent with the agency theory argument that monitoring and incentives can behave as complements to one another, the results suggest venture capitalist backing and incentive stock options for all employees operate in concert to have a positive effect on stock price performance three years after the initial public offering.

Comments

Abstract only. Full-text article is available only through licensed access provided by the publisher. Published in Journal of Developmental Entrepreneurship, 13(4), 409-423. Members of the USF System may access the full-text of the article through the authenticated link provided.

Language

en_US

Publisher

Norfolk State University

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.