Title

Just, unjust, and just-cause dismissals.

SelectedWorks Author Profiles:

Thomas J. Carter

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

1997

ISSN

0164-0704

Abstract

Job security or just-cause employment laws have been studied in several moral hazard or shirking models of efficiency wages. Employment rises in some models, falls in others. Curiously, these models usually assume either that no non-shirking workers are unjustly fired or that no shirking workers are justly fired. This paper allows for both types of dismissals. Because the just-cause law reduces the number of unjust dismissals, worker welfare rises. Because the number of just dismissals also falls, productivity declines. Overall, the just-cause laws lead to greater worker welfare with no drop in profits or output.

Comments

Citation only. Full-text article is available through licensed access provided by the publisher. Members of the USF System may access the full-text of the article through the authenticated link provided.

Publisher

Elsevier

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.