Title

Are wages too low? Empirical implications of efficiency wage models.

SelectedWorks Author Profiles:

Thomas J. Carter

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

1999

ISSN

0038-4038

Abstract

Firms may pay efficiency wages to enhance productivity. The conventional presumption is that efficiency wages are inefficiently high because they lead to unemployment that is also inefficiently high; government policies that lower wages raise output. Using a simple and general efficiency wage model, this paper finds a necessary and sufficient condition for the opposite conclusion. If the condition holds, wages are inefficiently low, leading to productivity that is also inefficiently low. It is the high-wage policies that raise output, even if they also lower employment. Published empirical results support the condition. No evidence is found for the conventional presumption.

Comments

Citation only. Full-text article is available through licensed access provided by the publisher. Members of the USF System may access the full-text of the article through the authenticated link provided.

Publisher

Wiley-Blackwell

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.