Title

Protecting civilians…or soldiers? Humanitarian law and the economy of risk in Iraq.

SelectedWorks Author Profiles:

Thomas W. Smith

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2008

Date Issued

January 2008

Date Available

January 2012

Abstract

The level of non-combatant casualties in modern Western warfare is determined in large part by the way in which policymakers apportion risk between soldiers and civilians. In the U.S. counterinsurgency in Iraq, a ‘‘kinetic’’ strategy and a muscular doctrine of force protection have lowered the threshold for the use of violence and, in many cases, transferred risk from soldiers to civilians. Particularly in areas deemed hostile, aggressive tactics make up for a shortage of soldiers on the ground and direct violence toward non-combatants. This is not the fog of war: even unintended civilian casualties flow predictably from policy choices. Perceptions of risk increasingly govern U.S. interpretations of its humanitarian obligations under international law, threatening to dilute the doctrine of proportionality and reverse the customary and legal relationship between combatants and non-combatants. Only late in the war has the U.S. administration recalibrated risks and launched a more orthodox counterinsurgency strategy.

Comments

Abstract only. Full-text article is available only through licensed access provided by the publisher. Published in International Studies Perspectives, 9, 144-164. doi: 10.1111/j.1528-3585.2008.00324.x Members of the USF System may access the full-text of the article through the authenticated link provided.

Language

en_US

Publisher

Blackwell Publishing,

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.