Title

The evolution of cooperative hierarchies through natural selection processes.

SelectedWorks Author Profiles:

Deby L. Cassill

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2010

Date Issued

January 2010

Abstract

According to a bioeconomic model called skew selection, individuals form cooperative hierarchies when coping with high risk environments that include predators and cycles of scarce resources. This paper reports a study that used agent-based computer simulations to experimentally test the predictions of skew selection. Results of the experiment showed that successful face-to-face transaction strategies varied with environmental risks. Risks involving resource scarcity favored clustering and stealing. Risks involving predators favored clustering and hoarding. A combination of risks involving resource scarcity and predators favored clustering and sharing. Wealthy donors gained safety-in-numbers to protect them from predators; at the same time, marginal recipients gained resources to protect them from starving. In summary, our findings show that even though natural selection is not a moral process, it can produce moral behavior.

Comments

Abstract only. Full-text article is available only through licensed access provided by the publisher. Published in Journal of Bioeconomics, 12(1), 29-42. doi:10.1007/s10818-010-9080-y Members of the USF System may access the full-text of the article through the authenticated link provided.

Publisher

Springer Verlag

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.