The Cyprus Question: Do Good Fences Make Good Neighbors?

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The Cyprus Question:

Do Good Fences Make Good Neighbors?

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Special “thank you” to Jason Sears
“Humans are not by nature kings, or nobles, or courtiers, or rich. All are born naked and poor. All are subject to the miseries of life, to frustrations, to ills, to needs, to pain of every kind. Finally, all are condemned to death. That is what is really the human being; that is what no mortal can avoid. Begin, then, by studying what is the most inseparable from human nature, that which constitutes humanness”

—Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile, Book IV
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**Introduction: The Cyprus Question**

Since WWII, ethnic conflict has been the most common and the most violent form of human conflicts. These brutal disputes have inflicted unimaginable human suffering through the destabilization of entire regions, devastation of economic development, and the deracination of entire communities. Violent ethnic conflicts have been re-writing the geopolitical map as we know it and forcing colossal changes to the realm of diplomatic relations. Despite the wide-ranging implications of ethno-conflict, insufficient analysis has been paid to their resolution worldwide. Most of the culture conflicts drawing our attention today are based on historic or ancestral claims. Interestingly, ancient history may be a past of glory and honor or of humiliation and dishonor, or a combination of both, since either can function as a means to motivate and define a group; this work takes and anthropological perspective on international ethnic conflict through the examination of the social and biological aspects of ethno-logic. Specifically, this position will focus its attention on Cyprus – a tiny island located in a region characterized by fierce nationalism and overburdened by ethnic disputes. At the heart of the Cyprus Question lies the mystery of affinity, the sense of belonging whether to a nation or to a people. Ethnic identity plays an important part in day-to-day politics and has even become politically institutionalized through different systems on germane national or regional levels. Cultural conflicts highlight the human dimension—a dimension that is primarily one of endless and often senseless human suffering. Ethnic identities are far from fixed or certain, they are rather fluid, socially constructed concepts established through territorial boundaries and group formation. Ethnic identifications are internally and externally constructed and formed in relation to the outside world. Ultimately, this work uses a holistic approach, with culture as its focal point, to question and deconstruct cultural claims and group incentive between the two
competing ethnic groups residing on Cyprus—the Greek-Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots—and finally critiques the use of barriers in dealing with ethnic-political conflict.
Chapter 1: The Anthropology of Ethnic Political Conflict

The disease of mutual distrust among nations is the bane of modern civilizations. – Franz Boas

We do not see things as they are. We see them as we are. – Talmud

Human biology is an extremely general concept. It concerns all biological aspects of humanity, encompassing elements from atoms and ecology to distinct disciplines such as human physiology, pharmacology, psychology, medicine, genetics, etc. All of these elements can be condensed to the term -- biological anthropology (Chapman 47). Ethnicity is a major factor in marital choices as well as patterns of mating; these factors may potentially lead to a ‘Mendelian’ population. Conceptually, a Mendelian population refers to a group within which the majority of individuals find mates for procreation of the next generation. The biological process can be explained as:

“A totally isolated, endogamous population gradually derives from other populations in the frequencies of its genes, through the process of mutation, natural selection, and genetic drift. This would result in a distinctive genetic structure and in discontinuity at the boundaries of the ‘population’ in genetic marker frequencies and possibly in other biological measurements. Individuals migrating into the population introduce the genes of the wider human gene pool; out-migrant’s spread the genes of the isolated population into the wider population” (Chapman 49).

In turn the Mendelian population is defined by the degree of endogamy within the group. The most reproductively isolated populations are clearest where they have natural barriers (sea, mountains, etc.) or where they are divided based on religion or other beliefs. However, ‘true’ isolates are rare or more likely nonexistent whatsoever. Virtually all societies contain social norms which govern marital choice, and in nearly all cases, marriage is expected to be between members within the same socially defined community. Furthermore, the social cohesion of a group depends on group identity and carries on ethnicity (Chapman 51).
The mission of social anthropology is to consider diversity in history, in cultural customs, in social systems, and so on. Biological anthropologists on the other hand concentrate their attention on diversity in gene frequencies, anthropometric measurements, diets, disease, etc. Self-definition and perception of society, as well as inconsistencies between reported perceptions are socially significant. The resulting ethnic group can be analyzed based on the clumping of genetic data. Therefore, both social as well as biological aspects lead to the degree of a Mendelian population in the way that socially constructed identities lead to a genetically endogamous community. Ultimately, ethnographic-biological research can be applied politically to verify ethnic claims. The case of the ‘Cyprus Question’ is a prime example of how ethnic groups have made cultural claims to cite ancestral homogeneity. How ethnic groups manipulate these claims, flaunts them, ignores them, rejects them, depend on the circumstances (Chapman 83).

Most of the culture conflicts drawing our attention today are based on historic ancestral claims. Interestingly, ancient history may be a past of glory and honor or of humiliation and dishonor, or a combination of both, since either can function as means to motivate and define a group (Eller 31). Commonly, ethnic groups will reference a grand historical military defeat to evoke memory and emotion, thus stimulating a desire for revenge and redemption which mobilizes the group even centuries later. However, many question: Are ethnic groups real or are they a fabrication of the mind of the analyst or ethnic innovator? Anthropology offers critical specialized perspectives to the treatment of ethnic conflict: 1) a holistic approach, incorporating, historical, political, economic, and other data into the complete account of social phenomena; 2) uses culture as its focal point; 3) through the use of well-tuned concepts, it questions and deconstructs cultural claims to understand group incentive; 4) collects and
analyzes data respectfully, yet wary of the imposition of foreign distinctions and definitions (Eller 2). Most states in the world today are in fact plural, many in an extreme and dangerous way, aggregating groups with no common identity or with real mutual animosity (Eller 2). Based on some accounts, the world today possesses as many as five thousand distinguishable ethnic groups or seven to eight thousand linguistic ethnic, or religious ethnic groups in plural societies (Eller 3).

Violent conflict between countries or ‘states’ has become less frequent in recent decades, however, conflict between ‘non-state’ groups has increased with frequency and ferocity. One source claims that at least eighty times since WWII, non-state group conflict has escalated into war, and over two-hundred such groups have structured themselves in a way to promote their collective interests against governments and other small groups (Eller 1).

“Ethnicity is no mere reflection or reflex of culture, especially of traditional culture, but a complex reworking, remembering, sometimes reinvention, and always employment of culture in the light and service of present and even future considerations. Further, culture may as easily hinder as facilitate mobilization. Ethnicity and the conflict that ensues from it is not purely instrumental or practical, but both are shaped by the conjunction of culture or history as remembered and of present challenges and conditions and future goals and visions” (Eller 5).

In the late twentieth century, emotionally charged episodes of ethnic conflict began to captivate the world’s attention like no other social phenomenon had before. The problem with ‘ethnicity’ is its indefinite and ever expanding domain. The foundations, ‘markers’, history, and goals of ethnicity vary from case to case. Cultural anthropologist Jack Eller explains, “Not all ethnic groups are ancient organic social entities; some can make that claim, while others are noticeably recent. Not all ethnic groups are in conflict, not all conflicts are equal in intensity, and not all conflicts seek the same ends” (Eller 8). The elusiveness of ethnicity has have made it one of the most elastic social concepts.
Ethnicity is defined as “the character, quality, or condition of ethnic group membership, based on an identity with/ and or a consciousness of a group belonging that is differentiated from others by symbolic markers (including cultural, biological, or territorial), and is rooted in the bonds to a shared past and perceived ethnic interests (Eller 8). In addition, ethnicity may be the maximal case of societally structured intimacy and kinship experience (Eller 9). If a group is not conscious of, or organized based on distinct characteristics, then there is no ethnic connection, no matter how unique it may be. Ethnicity is not an objective experience because it requires an *ethnic consciousness* – a certain objectification of culture and cultural difference in relation to one’s own culture; Therefore, “People who live there life unproblematically tend not to be “ethnic” in the proper sense of the word,” explains Eller (Eller 11). The classic definition of the ethnic group provided by Max Weber describes it as “one of those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities in physical type or of customs of both, or because of memories of colonization or migration; conversely, it does not matter whether or not an objective blood relationship exits” (Eller 12). Concepts of origin and decent are regularly maintained in the ideology of group identity, however, it is insignificant whether these claims are verifiable.

‘Ethnicity’, in the sense in which we use it in modern social science, is a relatively modern term, coined around the early 1950’s and gradually reaching general use in the 1960’s. The term itself derives from Ancient Greek *ethno-* ‘group of people of shared characteristics’ (Chapman 15). Greeks today use ‘ethnos’ as reference to intimate self-definition. Modern Greeks are a representation of the quintessential ethnus (Chapman 18). This notion came about around the early nineteenth century when Greece basically became an experimental laboratory for modern nationalism, as the Ottoman Empire began to implode. The pre-existing sense of ethnos
combined with the semantic and political opposition of the crumbling Ottoman Empire led to the Modern Greek sense of ethnos as a self-realizing, self-defining power (Chapman 18-19).

Through the use of ethnography (ethnology refers to the ‘study of races’), anthropologists have begun to discover and admit that the unit analysis of the cultural world is not quite as orderly and trimmed as they have been portrayed. Anthropology has revealed the fact that social identity is a multifarious facet, flexible and negotiable. Groups exist with vague and permeable boundaries and even the most primitive and isolated tribes are in contact with other societies (Eller 15). As a species of collectivity the ethnic group lucratively combines symbolic and instrumental reasoning to clothe practical interests and competitions in the garb of antiquity, authenticity, and kinship – not to say it is a lie, only a translation – makes ethnicity and ethnic groups uniquely attractive, uniquely real, and uniquely irresistible to their opponents (Eller 15).

Nationalism

Malcolm Chapman conceptualizes ethnicity from a social anthropological perspective. He explains that societies and cultures, however defined, are interested in boundaries. However, due to the flexible and ever-changing nature of social anthropology the field is virtually boundless and inexhaustible. He explains, “No definitive treatment is practically possible. Any selection of themes must, therefore, be arbitrary to some extent” (Chapman 1). The roots of ethnicity derive from the idea of self-definition. The way people define themselves based on the manipulation of subjective experiences provides support for modes of self-identification, in turn it leads to in interest in how people perceive and define others in pursuit of their own definition. Eventually this gradual recognition of ‘self’ and ‘others’ evolves into a sustained recognition that will later aide in the process of group formation. According to
Chapman, “social definition of what constituted a’ group’ was often surprisingly independent of ‘population’, as defined in terms of positivist biological or genetic science” (Chapman 2). Essential aspects of ethnicity concern the views of insiders and the perceptions of outsiders. Helen Macbeth explains how, “Although these views may be two views of the same classification, and so can coincide, frequently they do not coincide exactly; people on the outside may not perceive diversity and divisions which are very significant to those within the group (Chapman 51).

The radical appropriation and application of “otherness” within the practical domain is likely to deny any common cultural ground between groups so that no other group can refute the other. These ‘primordial’ claims are highly corrosive to political integration, because these claims legitimize a system of unimpeachable values and truths. In this way, “ethnic groups are products of a politicized version of cultural relativism,” claims Eller (Eller 16). When ethnicity is coupled with nationalism it results in a whole other breed of social power. The nationalistic ethnic group is significantly different from the non-nationalistic ethnic group in terms of relation to culture and political aims. Nationalism serves a population as an ideology as well as a political movement. It is a form of culture with four goals: 1) Transforming passive ethnic groups into an active, competitive ethno-political community; 2) Organizing a sense of “high culture” within the community; 3) Molding the nation into a culturally homogenous organic nation; 4) and lastly, obtaining a home territory (Eller 22). Nationalist movements seek recognition, respect, and justice for the culture and its people. Interestingly Eller notes, “The mere memory of having had a distinct culture in the past may be sufficient to create and maintain a sense of nationhood” (Eller 25). Nevertheless, nationalism serves as the method of cohesion in converting the masses into a nation. Typically, “it is first necessary to vernacularize
them and thereby bestow a unique identity and destiny upon them” (Eller 26). This can be done through the resurrection of an attractive ancient but decayed ethic identity. The next step is to create or elevate the concept of a high culture:

“Nationalist leaders (or would-be leaders) may rummage through, for example, peasant cultures for symbols, behaviors, tales, myths, and the like that can be appropriated, packaged, and “sold” as the national culture and then re-vernacularized, often from the same people from whom it was lifted. Yet, in the process of collection, assembly, and interpretation, and vernacularization, what is produced is not the same culture as the “peasant” or “rural” or traditional culture that was ostensibly discovered” (Eller 26).

The perception of ethnic groups and nations is typically presented as an extensive, incessant, often glorious history of cultural distinctness (as well as conflict) that bestows upon them sentiments of rights and determinations. As a cultural past or tradition the ethnic group defines “what we are” in terms of “what we were”. However, memory is both porous and productive, and the past is elusive, especially but not exclusively when the past was a preliterate period. The porosity of memory allows memory to slip in and slip out, rendering the firmest memories contestable (Eller 29).

**European Colonialism**

The period of European colonialism was a critical historical period for many groups – featuring a variety of social and cultural changes to non-Western traditional societies. With little to no regard for sociocultural boundaries, colonial political boundaries were drawn. In some cases, groups that previously barely interacted with each other or had a history of hostility were suddenly pushed into the same colony. While other groups who had more or less a sense of ethnic consciousness, were divided across two or more colonies. Next, notions of race were developed to classify people and explain behavioral differences in terms of physical differences.
and then superimposed upon non-Western plural societies. Race was believed to be a real, distinct, circumscribed phenomenon with a discernable set of traits based on physical rather than cultural traits. Though,

“The two concepts (physical and cultural traits) work hand in hand, since a set of cultural traits could ideally be attributed to the group identified by its set of physical traits. Race was often linked to or established on the basis of cultural characteristics, most particularly language or territory: the thinking was “every language group a race, and every race a language group” and “every territorial group a race and every race a territorial group”. Race was often even something of a synonym for society or nation (Eller 33-34).

Ultimately race labels not only expressed, “we are different from you” but “we are better than you”. The imposition of foreign power had several social/political implications. One effect was the actual creation of a new elite, advantaged class. The later stage of colonialism (paradoxically) featured effort toward some degree of democracy. However, these attempts,

“…have often if not usually had the effect of intensifying group competition and identification; under the practice of “communal representation,” which was viewed at some colonies at some times as the best way to represent all people and to balance the interests of the constituent groups, group differences were reified, institutionalized and politicized in unprecedented ways to ensure groups a share of power as groups” (Eller 35).

**Self-Determination**

Throughout the early twentieth century the world witnessed the collapse and dismemberment of several European empires, notably the Ottoman and Austrian, and the establishment of new states based on the Wilsonian principal of self-determination. The notion of self-determination became the first the battle-cry to gain independence from empires (as used in the late 19th century) or as an attempt to secede from resultant states. Once these ‘new states’ gained their independence, their social political policies further segmented and created conflict among ethnic groups (Eller 37-38). Nations are not objective or absolute things, yet unaskable
questions regarding governance, political representation, cultural institutionalization, economic development, and educational and occupational opportunity were readily being answered by colonists. Ultimately, the fulfillment of self-determination within colonial boundaries, often through the outright use of force, revived or preserved old differences and animosities or developed new ones.

**Past as Myth**

Most ethnic groups define and characterize themselves through their real or supposed common history, descent, or kinship. The ‘myth of common ancestry’, is often a “remote and improvable history” says Eller. Myths of ethnicity contain stories of: “origin; migration and liberation; of descent; of heroic age; of communal decline, conquest, and exile; and of rebirth, with a summons to action” (Eller 40).

“While many historians try to find out what really happened … most anthropologists would rather concentrate on showing the ways in which historical accounts are used as tools in the contemporary creation of identities and in politics. Anthropologists would stress that history is not a product of the past but a response to the requirements of the present” (Eller 40).

The ethnic past-as-myth theory in the purest sense is generally, if not always nostalgia — seen through the emotional lens of retrospective regrets and longings. Overall, it is a “complex and empirically specific amalgamation of remembering, forgetting, interpreting, and inventing” (Eller 41). Ethnic groups use past claims as a resource: The ethnic past is a subjective reconstruction that provides the individuals some cultural, historical symbols to unify around. Thus the group defines itself based on the mythical character of the past. In addition, these historical cultural markers serve as a crucial link between the past, present, and future – in order to give the group basic understanding of the social present and justify claims on it.
Culture and history are used as tools of struggle and communication to legitimize demands within the political sphere. In turn, culture is used as a political weapon in diplomatic settings and not-so-diplomatic settings (Eller 42).

For the most part, ethnicity is essentially a product of modern and modernizing conditions (Eller 44). The ethnic group is not entirely a “backward-looking social collectivity” nor is it necessarily “an objective, organic, or unitary one”, Eller explains, it is very much a product of the present. It is a product of the past insofar as it is the presence of the past in and under the operation of circumstances new and unique to the present (Eller 47). On the political stage, ethnic groups are interest groups - using claims to culture and history as a supporting weapon.

**Herder and European Romantic Nationalism**

Each national group argues that it is organic unit, a national organism – unique and exceptional in natural qualities: genius, language, culture, and spirit. German nationalist philosopher Johann Herder (1744-1803) developed the theory of “ethnic consciousness”. He understood that, most likely every society in human history has been aware of difference, even if it has not been relativistic and tolerant of difference; He says terms like heathen, barbarian, savage, and ethnic in its original sense bear witness to that fact (Eller 50). Herder believed that, “humanity as a species is on a mission of higher development and achievement but that the agent of this development is not the species as a whole or as the individual but at an intermediate-group level (Eller 51). Herder was fascinated by the peculiarity of nationality; He claimed that in the national unit, “the group becomes a single being, an individuality, a personality, in which culture is the national personality, the group mind”, in addition he
confessed that nationality and culture are not organic or spontaneous, but rather “sought, assembled, protected, and advanced” identities (Eller 51-52).

The Foundations of a Social Science of Ethnicity: Early Ethnology, Boas, and Weber

The birth of anthropology as we know it became available through British colonialism and contact with the indigenous people. Franz Boas, perhaps the first professional modern anthropologist (originally natural scientist), conducted fieldwork in North America, where he studied intellectual trends and eventually realized the ways anthropology could contribute to important social issues such as racism, classism, and nationalism. The field of anthropology is always concerned with the group more than the individual. Through his fieldwork he recognizes that primitive societies and tribes are not actually socially and culturally isolated, he notes that even the simplest groups have been affected or changed by contact with others. Through his research he successfully and repeatedly deconstructs and debunks the concept of race arguing: 1) a race is not an objective or demonstrable decent group; 2) there is much physical variation within a race as between races; 3) there are no clear-cut geographical and biological lines between races; 4) there is no correlation between race on the one hand and either mental or cultural characteristics on the other. This is a valuable lesson that has yet to be learned by all citizens and certainly by all ethnic members and activists (Eller 57). So then, what exactly constitutes a nation? Interestingly, Boas distinguishes between the two kinds of nationalism: nationalism of nations and nationalism of nationalities (Eller 58). Ultimately, Boas approves of the efforts of nations and nationalities to integrate through higher levels of social integration. However, he does not condone nationalism in the sense of separatism and particularism and the manner in which it divides people into smaller and less-encompassing social groupings.
Symbolism as the Medium of Political Exchange

Thurman Arnold, a witty legal scholar from a half-century ago, observed that all human conduct and all institutional behavior are symbolic. Human reality is not provided at birth by the physical universe, but rather fashioned by the subjective experiences of the individual. Each individual is confronted with an infinite amount of stimuli, because it is beyond human conception to deal with all of them, the individual must be selective in their perceptions. In turn, those aspects of the world must be further selected and reduced and fashioned in to collective mental paradigms that make sense to the individual. This order of simplification and categorization is largely provided by the symbol system individuals learn as members of a culture; symbol systems are a primary means through which humans give meaning to the world. People are generally not even aware that they themselves endow the world with their own symbolically constructed interpretation of reality, but through symbols humans are able to create order where there is only chaos (Kertzer 5). In turn, Kertzer explains, “Ritual serves as an analytical category that helps us deal with the chaos of the human experience and put it into a coherent framework” (Kertzer 8).

Politics is expressed through symbolism; symbols instigate social action and define the individual’s sense of self. The art of politics requires an understanding how symbols are operative in society and issuing them forth in action. Political figures use rights to construct political reality for people around them. Through their participation of rights, citizens of the modern state identify with larger political forces that can be seen only in symbolic form. As Waltzer puts it, “The state is invisible; it must be personified before it can be seen, symbolized before it can be loved, imagined before it can be conceived” (Kertzer 6). Without rites and symbols there are no nations.
Kertzer defines ritual as action wrapped in a web of symbolism (Kertzer 9). The purpose of ritual serves to link the individual with the larger society. The power of ritual stems from the inextricably linked dimensions of the social matrix and its psychological underpinnings. Kertzer claims:

“Through ritual the individual’s subjective experience interacts with and is molded by social forces. Most often, people participate in ritual forms that they had nothing to do with creating. Even when individuals invent new rituals, they create them largely out of a stockpile of preexisting symbols, and the rituals become established not because of the psychic processes of the inventor but because of the social circumstances of the people who participate in the new rite” (Kertzer 10).

Ritual plays a major role in nurturing and expressing a social consensus. Yet, interestingly,

“Ritual can serve political organizations by producing bonds of social solidarity without requiring a uniformity of belief. This is of tremendous political value, since what often underlies people’s political allegiances is their social identification with a group rather than their sharing of beliefs with other members... Beliefs are privately held and in some sense unknowable, while rituals provide public statements of acceptance of a group’s position” (Kertzer 67-68).

Therefore, ritual is capable of promoting social solidarity without implying that people share the same values or even same interpretation of the ritual (Kertzer 69). The genius lies in the sense that solidarity is produced by people acting together, not necessarily thinking together. What is pervasive about ritual is the way it actually discourages critical thinking (Kertzer 85). Ritual is a form of formalized communication that presents a well-defined course of action. Still, “Rituals are not simply a blind product of communal existence; rather, they serve certain political interests and undermine others”, Kertzer explicates; thus they must be examined in in political terms to determine how they develop, how they are sustained and changed, and who benefits from them (Kertzer 87).
Each society has its own mythology detailing its origins and sanctifying its norms (Kertzer 12). Ritual practices are a major way for propagating these myths. Organizations propagate myths regarding their origin and purpose, while members engage in symbolic practices that distinguish them from non-members (Kertzer 17-18). Ritual serves important communicative purposes within organizations; an organization's political position is often communicated more effectively and credibly through ritual than simple written platforms or oral addresses (Kertzer 31). Ritual action is characterized by highly structured standardized sequences and is often enacted at certain places during certain times that are themselves endowed with a certain, often more important symbolic meaning (Kertzer 9). Kertzer observes, “Politics occurs through societal mechanisms that are not themselves seen as political in nature” (Kertzer 19). Politics is full of ritual dramas; candidates of election campaigns and the mass media carefully arrange well-choreographed, symbolically-charged dramatic productions every day. Symbols provide the context of the ritual. Mass rallies and other demonstrations are effective in both dramatically exemplifying the group's strength as well as fostering certain images regarding the nature of the group and its goals, it also allows members to speak directly to the public and opposition forces—increasing identification with the group and reinforcing opposition to adversaries.

The information that is received through our senses is processed through preexisting systems of stigmatized and abstracted knowledge called schemas. Thus there is a strong conservative bias built into our perceptions and thought processes. Since we interpret what we encounter on in daily life in terms of pre-established schemas that tell us what to expect, information that conflicts with our schema is often largely ignored while information that appears to confirm it is seized (Kertzer 80). Although cognition is often contrasted with
emotion, they are in fact closely linked. For instance, the more emotionally aroused people become, the more focused their attention becomes and fewer categories are used to interpret their experience; on an extreme level, the emotionally charged individual may operate with an overriding cognitive division of people into just two categories: “with me” and “against me” (Kertzer 82).

What makes the cognitive aspect of ritual so fascinating is and so politically salient is frequently its connection to particular cognitive messages. Rituals are not only emotionally compelling, but effective. By repetitively employing a limited pool of powerful symbols associated with emotional fervor, rituals mold political beliefs. Ritual defines our political realities but constantly reaffirm our beliefs through regular collective expression (Kertzer 95). Symbolism is the medium of political exchange; it is an exchange that not only redistributes political rewards but forms the basis of our political understandings. If symbols and rituals are used to structure our political realities, is it because we as humans can do it no other way? Yet, Kertzer makes clear, “Our symbol system, then, is not a cage that locks us into a single view of the political world, but a mélange of symbolic understandings by which we struggle through a continuous series of negotiations, to assign meaning to events (Kertzer 175).

In some respects, ritual is even more important to revolutionary movements and regimes than to its long established political organizations. In many ways, ritual can be considered the life blood of revolution. Radical political shifts require strong support to be institutionalized; this requires people to give up long established habits as well as previous conceptions of the world (Kertzer 153). Again here, ritual is needed define political regimes and to identify individuals within those organizations. Ritual is employed to legitimize a wholly new regime and to delegitimize the old one; this is done through the mystification of an
emerging dictatorship with symbols of democracy and the creation of solidarity among people who had vastly different conceptions about what the whole enterprise was about (Kertzer 160). Rites provide a basis for common identification and communication, a new definition of political relations, and delegitimating of existing ones. Symbolism is both necessary in sustaining the governing political order but also essential in overthrowing it and replacing it with a different political system.

**Anthropology**

Anthropology is not and cannot be a purely objective, positivistic, observation and analysis of culture. As with any dialogue, anthropology possesses a vantage point and a culture of its own. Yet anthropologists do their best to interpret cultures and their histories evenhandedly. Eller explains,

“Although ethnicity and ethnic conflict are not entirely pure cultural opportunism, and invention (of groups or even of traits) is not completely without restraint, failure to recognize the contextual, circumstantial, fictive, and political qualities of ethnicity render it and its resultant manifestations much more obscure, illogical, and fixed than they really are” (Eller 94).

Anthropologists claim, nation building requires the diminution of primordial sentiments to civil order in which, the whole society can be encompassed by the new civil state (Eller 23). The social collectivity of nation building has fascinated anthropologists for the past thirty years or more; they have witnessed and addressed the significance of the “making and breaking of nations” since the 1960’s.

Throughout much of the world, political relations have traditionally been founded on an ideology of common decent. People’s place in society is developed on the basis of who they were descended from, and in order to improve their social position they need to do it
collectively by improving the entire descent group to which they belonged. It is not required, however, to delve into the archeological record to observe what role ritual has played in political struggle against local decent based groups. Ritual is a pervasive part of modern political life yet few people recognize how important it is in modern politics. Political anthropologist, David Kertzer, explains: “Because ritual is usually identified with religion and, since modern Western societies have presumably separated political affairs from religious life, there is an assumption that ritual remains politically significant only in less “advanced” societies” (Kertzer 2). The underdevelopment of studies on the symbolic dimension of modern politics is due in part to the kinds of empirical methods used in modern science. Symbols cannot be satisfactorily studied in quantitative terms, nor through surveys or electoral analyses (Kertzer 7). Yet the reality is as Geertz asserts, “A world wholly demystified is a world wholly depoliticized” (Kertzer 48). Mystification is a product of human social construction of reality.
Chapter 2: Cyprus: From Accommodation to Conflict

“I therefore claim to show, not how men think in myths, but how myths operate in men's minds without their being aware of the fact” — Claude Levi-Strauss

“The great enemy of the truth is very often not the lie -- deliberate, contrived and dishonest -- but the myth -- persistent, persuasive and unrealistic” — John F. Kennedy

The Cyprus Revolt

The volatile recent past of Cyprus has turned the island, often presented in tourist literature as the idyllic Island of Aphrodite (goddess of love), into a place renowned for hostile confrontations (Papadakis 1). The notorious Cyprus dispute has caused internal violence both between the two major ethnic groups and within each ethnic group, leading to war, invasion, territorial division, population displacement, anti-colonial struggle, and post-colonial instability. Greek Hellenocentrists stress their primary identification and loyalty to Greece; they are proud of the Greek nation and being Greeks, therefore they are concerned with continuity of the present with the past. The ethnic nationalism of Greek Cypriots was primarily focused on union with Greece. The enosis movement was part of Greek irredentism. The prevailing ideology of Greek Cypriots was based on liberating “Greeks still under foreign yoke” and uniting them under one political roof. For the most part, these individuals feel that Cyprus is relatively unworthy in comparison with the glorious history of Greece, in turn; they would rather be called Greeks than Cypriots (Papadakis 111). After Sicily and Sardinia, Cyprus is the third largest Mediterranean island (Couloumbis 26). The cultural presence of Greeks on Cyprus can be traced to the earliest times of recorded history, and it has been continuous ever since (Couloumbis 26). The Turkish-speaking community’s presence on the island began in 1571 after
the conquest of Cyprus by the Ottoman Turks. The Ottomans owned Cyprus until 1878, when they leased the island to Britain in return for British support against the Russians. The British finally converted Cyprus to a Crown Colony in 1925. Remarkably, the Greek and Turkish Cypriots maintained a conflict-free record throughout the centuries of Ottoman and British administration (Couloumbis 27). The rise of nationalism during the first half of the twentieth century spilled over from the mainlands into Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus. Nationalism proved to be a mobilizing political and psychological force in Cyprus.

The Turkish Conquest of Cyprus

The Turkish conquest of Cyprus was not simply the belated mopping up of the last remains of the Byzantine Empire, but part of a long-running campaign between Ottoman Turks and Venice over control of the islands and seaways of the Eastern Mediterranean. Cyprus fell to the Turks in 1571, but was not actually striped from the Venetians until 1669 (Stephens 30). It took several centuries before the Ottomans were able to take full control of Cyprus; nevertheless, Turkish dominance lasted a little over a century. At first, the Turks were welcomed by the Greeks who regarded them as their “liberators who had delivered them both from the rapacious rule of the Venetians and the suppression of their church by the Latins” (Stephens 36). In addition, the Turks promised the native Cypriots just treatment without tyranny or provocation. However, the honeymoon period after the defeat of the Venetians was short-lived; it would only be a matter of time before Greek Cypriots desired new liberators (Stephens 37). After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, one small, yet strategically important area escaped allocation: Cyprus. With decolonization pressures developing in the 1950’s and 60’s, Cyprus soon developed into a major pain in the neck for Britain, Greece, and Turkey. The three NATO allies soon entered a “dangerous collision course” because each believed that their
national interests were at stake (Stephens 41). As the unquestioned leader of the Western Alliance, the United States received the task of forming a strategy that would lead to a diplomatic settlement (Couloumbis 26).

Greece and Turkey have been rivals since the Middle Ages and distrustful allies since their admission to NATO in 1952. Cyprus has been a “bone of contention” between them (Stearns 2). The United States has not had easy relations with Greece, Turkey, or Cyprus. Cyprus is a divided state featuring Turkish troops to the north and Greeks occupying the South. Since joining NATO, Greece and Turkey have on the verge of war six times over Greek and Turkish differences over the Aegean continental shelf, territorial air and sea space, military-command-and-control arrangements, as well as the interpretation of treaties. The United States’ relationship with Greece and Turkey has been, “less a source of mutual reassurance than of mutual recrimination” (Stearns 3). The US policy towards Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus has been one exclusively devoted to Soviet containment in the Aegean and Mediterranean. Greece and Turkey are the United States’ most distant NATO allies. Unresolved Greek-Turkish issues have hit the fan through a series of crises in Istanbul in 1955, in Cyprus 1963-64, 1967, and 1974, as well as numerable hostile situations in the Aegean (Stearns 5). The United States has been reluctantly forced to make many diplomatic decisions over the Cyprus Question.

The modern history of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey was initiated in the 1820s with a series of massacres. In March 1823, Turkish villagers were slaughtered in the Peloponnese during the outbreak of the Greek War of Independence. The Turkish Sultan retorted by publically hanging the Orthodox patriarch on Good Friday, executing the Greek ‘Dragoman of the Porte’, and massacring other Greek Christians throughout the empire. In Cyprus, the Greek War of Independence introduced the ‘fatal western idea’ of nationality. Previously, Greeks had
referred to themselves as Romans under the Byzantium. Therefore, there was no such thing as “Greece” until the early nineteenth century, equally there was no such thing as “Turkey” or “Turks” themselves until a century later. Under the Byzantium, Greeks identified themselves by the Greek religion and/or the Orthodox Christian religion. Thus, there could have been no enosis movement prior to the war of independence because there was no “Greece” for Cyprus to unite with. The Greek rebellion ushered a new phase of East European politics. Eventually, the Cyprus problem evolved into a dispute over the land, language, culture, and political sovereignty of the region (Stephens 44-45).

**How the Struggle Began**

The troubled history of Cyprus stems from its strategic position along the main routes between Europe and Asia. Historically, it has remained at the mercy of the dominant power in the area because it has been too small to exist by itself. Cyprus has been bought and sold, transferred from one ruler to another, without inhabitants ever being consulted. In return, Cypriots have rarely shared prosperity with conquerors, instead, they have been required to pay taxes to foreign rulers and supply foreign armies with their men and time. In addition, the island has endured earthquakes, droughts, and famines. Overall, Cypriots have fallen victim to an extremely turbulent past. However, political disasters since the 1974 Turkish invasion have been mostly self-inflicted. Archeological and historical evident has proven that the majority of the population is of a mixed race; nevertheless the most evident element of continuity has been the survival of Greek language and religion (Loizides 5). In addition, cultural differences also exist in the architecture and landscape: Turkish houses can be distinguished by their preference of wooden balconies and shutters and construction around a courtyard. Greek architecture on the other hand, reflects the neo-classical form of ancient Greece. From childhood forward, the
average Greek Cypriot is conditioned in church and school to believe that all Greek speaking communities are supposed to be united with the Motherland; This very concept of a ‘Greater Greece’ has inspired nationalism and advocated the struggle for enosis (Loizides 8). Greek Cypriots claim their descent from the early Aegean colonists who arrived around the ninth century B.C. Although many ‘Greeks’ came to inhabit the island, Greece itself at no point, ever controlled Cyprus (Loizides 10). In A.D. 45, Apostles Paul and Barnabas converted the island to Christianity. For over three hundred years, Greek and Turkish Cypriots lived in relative peace; the joint cultures based their common ground on a shared hostility towards their foreign oppressors. Greeks blame the inter-communal friction of modern times on Britain’s ‘divide and rule’ tactics. Although Turkish Cypriots make up the minority of the population, they had little to fear as long as the island belonged to Turkey. When the Greek War of Independence spurred the enosis movement, Turks felt threatened by the power of the Church in Cyprus so they publicly executed the Archbishop and other leading Christians in 1821 and from this point on Greek-Turkish relations ventured on a gradual path of disintegration -- leading first to civil strife and eventually war (Loizides 13). Turkish Cypriots are mostly Sunni Muslims. Unlike their Greek counterpart, they have never been subject to foreign rule prior to the British administration (which was still under consent of their own sultan) (Loizides 14). The social structure of Cyprus is deeply ingrained with separatist trends. Socially, Greeks and Turks rarely mingle; in fact, intermarriage is forbidden without outright conversion to the other side. Even in mixed villages, people lead separate lives of voluntary segregation. Even on a personal level, Greeks and Turks also exemplify differences in temperament and mentality (Loizides 21).

Britain’s interest in Cyprus has always been purely strategic; Nevertheless, British administration has always been tolerant of Greek nationalism. After Turkey fought alongside
Germany in WWI Britain annexed Cyprus; without commitments to the Turkish sultan Greek Cypriots argued for union with Greece. Winston Churchill wasn’t opposed to the idea either, in 1907 he wrote: “I think it only natural that the Cypriot people, who are of Greek decent, should regard their incorporation with what may be called their Motherland as an ideal to be earnestly, devoutly, and feverishly cherished”. In 1915, Great Britain wanted to enlist the Greeks into the entente ranks of World War I so they offered Cyprus to the neutralist Greek government under control of King Constantine I in condition for Greek military support, Britain offered Greece Cyprus. However, the offer was rejected by German-leaning Constantine, thus the opportunity to attain the important Greek objective was passed. After World War II and throughout the Cold War, Britain “appeared determined to maintain control over strategically located Cyprus” (Crawshaw 17). The absence of political violence gave the British the impression that the enosis movement was of little concern. In 1923, Greece and Turkey accepted British rule over Cyprus in the Treaty of Lausanne (once again without consulting the actual inhabitants of Cyprus first). In 1928, the British decided to celebrate their anniversary since occupation, this antagonized the Church and all enosis supporters; in response, the Church ordered all Greeks to boycott British ceremonies and encouraged boisterous demonstrations. In return, this inspired counter-agitation by the Turks who were opposed to any form of government that would bring them under Greece (Crawshaw 18). In 1929 a small Turkish Cypriot party formed which advocated the return of Cyprus to Turkey. British statesmen demonstrated insensitivity towards Cypriot aspirations; they dismissed the position by insisting that Cyprus has never been a part of Greece (Crawshaw 20). The enosis movement and failure to establish self-government have been the fundamental roots of the present catastrophe in Cyprus. In 1931, tension increased when the Chancellor or the Exchequer’s statement announced that the accumulated surplus from Cyprus revenues due to Turkey as a tribute under the 1878 Convention had instead been disposed of as
the sinking fund for the Turkish loan guaranteed by the British and French (Crawshaw 25). Elected Greek members refused to meet the substantial deficit though additional taxation. In response, the Greek Orthodox Church engaged in a series of inflammatory speeches and rioting broke out after enosis agitators burnt the Government House to the ground. The British Navy was called in to restore order in Cyprus. As a resolution, the Constitution was outlawed in Cyprus and the state was thereafter ruled by degree. Peace remained in Cyprus until the British government passed three new laws. According to the Cyprus administration, the affairs of the Church and monasteries could now be investigated by the government and their accounts audited (Crawshaw 27). In addition, any archbishop who is either deported or convicted of a crime worthy of imprisonment loses his status as archbishop for two years. These measures caused massive upheavals in ecclesiastical conferences (Crawshaw 29).

**The Cyprus Question**

Cyprus nationalists realized they could achieve nothing without the support of the Greek mainland. For a period, Cyprus Question was deliberately avoided by the Greek government in order not to humiliate Britain. Cypriots realized that without the support of a member state, they were at a dead end. The first Greek appeal to the UN was entirely disappointing; despite this pressure they were informed that they had already missed the deadline for the General Assembly’s agenda. However, Greek bishops in the United States and AHEPA were eager to help their cause (Couloumbis 21). Fortunately, the AHEPA was able to play a major role in the Cyprus struggle without interference from the US authorities because it involved the organization of a cultural society. In 1950, the Cyprus affairs branch of the AHEPA took their position to the State Department where they drew attention to the British government’s refusal to see the Cypriot delegation and the need for US intervention. However,
the West already had their hands full with the war in Korea; therefore, the State Department was unsympathetic to the issue (Couloumbis 24). In 1950, Archbishop Makarios III heralded an era of brilliant and intensive campaigning for enosis. Within a year Makarios had built wide range of contacts within the Greek political world. The relentless incompetence of British politicians and spokesmen hindered the Greek government’s efforts to develop a moderate policy over Cyprus (Crawshaw 57-62). In 1952, the Cyprus question began to dominate Greek political life. By 1953, Makarios sent the UN a notice requesting the organization to urge Britain to respect the Cypriot people’s right to self-determination. In addition, he asked Papagos and the Greek Government to back Cyprus with an appeal to the UN. He told Papagos: “We are entitled to, and demand, such support because what the Cypriots want is not self-government, or autonomy, or independence, but union with Greece”. If Greece failed to help, Makarios implied (threatened) that Cyprus would turn to “foreign sources”, referring to the Soviet Union (Crawshaw 70).

EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) was established as an anti-British terrorist network. George Grivas was the leader of the military coup. He was a Cypriot-born, Right-Wing army officer, whose logistical influence could be clearly traced back to Athens (Couloumbis 28). EOKA practiced propaganda by the deed by committing acts of sabotage against British military targets as well as Cypriots who issued soft attitudes towards British colonial authorities. At the same time, Greek Cypriots such as Archbishop Makarios dealt with the struggle for self determination politically; many Greek-Cypriots felt gaining support from the United Nations would be the best way to achieve a secure settlement (Couloumbis 28). The US hoped for a quiet resolution between the “UN family” so they discouraged the Greeks from taking the Cyprus Question to the UN. The Greeks however, felt outnumbered within NATO.
and preferred the multinational setting of the UN and the idea of settling the issue through public diplomacy (Couloumbis 28). American efforts were intended to prevent Cyprus from disturbing the smooth functioning southeastern flank of NATO. “The US tendency in the 1950s, therefore, was to counsel quiet diplomacy and the avoidance of using the UN as a means for embarrassingly airing the NATO family’s dirty linen” (Couloumbis 30).

The Climax in 1954

The concept of enosis in Greece had become a nation-wide obsession. In 1954, Lord Winster initiated a debate in the House of Lords, attempting to describe the general picture of the islands history. He explained that although Greece had never actually owned Cyprus, they still had ‘some shadowy claim based on the division of the Roman Empire into the East and West’. He determined that Britain’s international obligations accompanied by Turkish objections ruled out any chance of them giving up Cyprus (Crawshaw 80). Ultimately, the House of Lords decided that the issue wasn’t one to be of grave concern. A few months later, Greece sent to friendly foreign states a message addressing Britain’s repeated refusal to hold bilateral talks as the basis for taking the matter to the UN. The British government did their best to keep the issue out of public light in order to prevent controversy. During the first Greek appeal to the UN, speaker Alexis Kyrou explained that Greece was forced to revert to the UN for help because the British government denied direct negotiations and deprived the Cypriots their right of self-determination (Crawshaw 83). Under the terms of article 2(7), the discussion of Cyprus was left inadmissible. Australia and France voted against Greek appeal, Columbia, Netherlands, and the US abstained, and nine delegations voted in favor of Greek appeal. In the following debate, the British prime minister argued that Cyprus was essential to Britain for the treaty obligations to the Arab states, for commitments to the northern flank of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, and for the protection of Turkey and Greece themselves. Britain said that their policy towards Cyprus reflected the best interests of the Aegean and Middle East countries as well as the global world (Crawshaw 84). Ultimately Britain was arguing their case on the grounds of strategic priorities and the correctness of international law. Another speaker, Krishna Menon, was concerned that the people of Cyprus and been overlooked. He feared that, “very soon it would become a free-for-all, instead of ‘the homeland of the Cypriot nation’”. He disagreed with the British Minister’s strategic arguments stating, “We regard nationhood as territorial; it makes no difference to us whether in any particular territory, people are of one ethnic group or another” (Crawshaw 85). After Menon’s argument, thirty votes were cast in favor of Greek appeal, nineteen against, and eleven abstentions. There was a period of hopeful expectancy following the UN preliminary success. During this period, the Cyprus struggle was promoted in America and Britain. In addition, in its broadcasts to Cyprus, the Athens Radio attacked the constitutional proposals indicating enosists were still preoccupied by the fear that self-government, however limited, would upset any chances of union with Greece (Crawshaw 85). Greece and Turkey were now publically clashing over Cyprus and endangering the delicate nature of balancing alliances that had only been recently concluded.

Changes of 1957

Britain’s strategic requirements had significantly changed by mid-1957. The Suez fiasco of 1956 had surfaced issues regarding concealed military misgivings in military circles about the merits of Cyprus as a base; Britain no longer needed the island in conjunction with a complex of middle-east bases and treaties, many of which had ceased to exist (Crawshaw 258). The Defense of White Paper in April 1957 brought about the first hint of change, announcing the British government’s decision to reduce its overseas military commitments. Previously, Britain’s role in
Cyprus was to be a ‘holding operation’ pending a settlement that was acceptable to Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus. The second hint of change was obvious in Greece, once a distraction, the Cyprus issue now evolved as a major priority for the Greek Government. In order to resolve the issue, Greece felt they needed to first become a full member of NATO and restore relations with Turkey. By 1957, Greek statesmen were prepared to discuss the independence of Cyprus under international pledge. By 1957, the prospects of sovereignty as a political solution had slightly improved. The Greek Government was also doing its best to shift the stand of hostility to that of détente with Turkey (Crawshaw 258-262).

The Twelve Session of the UN General Assembly entailed: 1) the application under the UN of the principal of equal rights and self-determination of the peoples etc. in the case of Cyprus. 2) Violation of human rights and atrocities by the British Colonial Administration against the Cypriots. In addition, Since Resolution 1013, a permanent representative of Greece noted that after two months, no progress had been made; in turn Cypriot compliance with the Resolution had merely resulted in unilateral violence toward the Cypriots (Crawshaw 266). Tyranny still reigned in Cyprus. Meanwhile, Selim Sarper spoke on behalf of the Turkish delegate; Turkey supported the possibility of self-determination but was opposed to using it as a cloak for annexation. Sarper claimed that separatism was already inherent within the social structure of Cyprus but terrorism organized by extremists from Greece had strained the Greek-Turkish relations to the point of hostility which made corporation between them impossible. In addition, Sarper noted that Turkey had not always been aligned with Britain, yet Turkish officers and men could testify the honorable manner in which British officers carried out their duties in Cyprus. Ultimately, Sarper blamed the turmoil in Cyprus on Greek terrorism (Crawshaw 268). The Greek case we restated by Savvas Loizides, a Cypriot nationalist and
Greek subject; Loizides begged the committee to read *The Violation of Human Rights in Cyprus*, which had been recently published by Ethnarchy. Loizides used an Article from the Sunday Dispatch as supporting evidence, and then concluded with the support for self-determination. He said every hesitation on part of the UN to settlement would result in “more bloodshed, more pain, and horror in prison and concentration camps and interrogation rooms” (Crawshaw 269). The UN debate was then followed by a brief period of calm.

**Paving a Way for Independence**

Political developments by the end of 1958 demonstrated that the concept of independence for Cyprus was not new. America was now in complete support with the British on the issue of self-determination. The Archbishop of the Greek Orthodox Church said to base the next Greek appeal on self-determination before the British imposed a partnership plan that would most likely end up in partition. The British government was no longer opposed to granting the Cypriots full independence, however, they felt that premature attempts to push the issue would inevitably intensify racial tension on the island. After renewed attacks by the EOKA, the British government decided to follow their plan (Crawshaw 322-323). Meanwhile, the EOKA continued to attack through autumn and winter, causing mass casualties and a significant number of bomb explosions in the NAAFI quarters. The bid for independence at the UN began November 25, the first speaker was the Greek Foreign Secretary, Evanghelos Averoff, launched a sharp attack on Britain and Turkey noting Britain’s disregard for Resolution 1013, he said the Macmillan Plan was evidence of the murderous knife of partition, and that British talks and conferences were merely a maneuver and attempt to block UN action. He also accused Turkey of attempting to revive the Ottoman Empire, as well as ignoring the Treaty of Lausanne; finally he argued the partition of Cyprus was a Turkish territorial claim that reflected
expansionist ambitions (Crawshaw 329-330). Commander Noble, from the British delegate focused on Britain’s efforts in the Cyprus problem stressing the international aspects, including the abortive NATO initiative, to find a solution. Britain’s willingness to share sovereignty of the island with Greece and Turkey after seven years indicated her retention of the island on the present basis that there should be no obstacle to final settlement. However, Fatim Zorlu, the Turkish Foreign Minister accused the Greek Government’s independence proposal to be a tactical move and a procedural rewording of its demand for enosis. He also blamed the Cypriots of trying to wipe out the Turkish minority, and held the Greeks primarily responsible for the inter-communal strife. Zorlu concluded that if independence or self-determination was granted to Cyprus, it must be granted equally to both communities (Crawshaw 330). Anglo-Cypriot talks continued until July 1960 and eventually these discussions paved way for independence. The Constitution, which took over a year to finish, had now been prepared for several months. Eighty-two years of British rule was bought to an end. The war against the British had been waged in the name of anti-colonialism and self-determination, for this was in keeping with the trend of the day and the easiest and most efficient way to gain international support (Crawshaw 362-363). However, the enosis struggle would soon be renewed, this time uniting both Greeks and Greek Cypriots in direct conflict against the Turks, which would progress into Turkish invasion and occupation in the northern region of the island. The birth of the republic only symbolized the calm before the storm (Crawshaw 361-363).

The Compromise of 1960

Forging the nation state proved to be more tedious than ever expected, and the Compromise of 1960 of a bi-ethnic state was the only alternative left, the Compromise produced an even more divided population than ever, ones based on dual loyalties and identities.
“Most Greek Cypriots considered independence to be the first step towards enosis. When the realization gradually grew that this was no longer a feasible goal, simmering intra-ethnic tensions began to escalate. Makarios, who had to worry about inter-communal rivalry, threats from Turkey, and strained relations with Greece, was forced to increasingly distance himself from ethnic nationalist goals, and in 1968, he declared that enosis, though still the “ideal” goal, was nevertheless hardly realizable, signaling his turn to the more realistic policy of supporting independence” (Papadakis 103).

Cyprus nationalism gained prominence in the years following 1974, after what became referred to as—The Great Betrayal of Greece—followed by a belated appreciation of the benefits of independence; enosis was declared officially dead, and reunification of the island became the new goal to strive for. Cypriots who thought in these terms, formed the Neo-Cypriot Association, emphasizing to think first as Cypriots then as Greeks or Turks. Members promoted love of country, values of understanding between its communities, the consolidation of a democratic way of life, and identifying as a Cypriot above all (Papadakis 104). They hold Greeks responsible for destruction of biblical proportions: forty percent of the land came under Turkish control, a third of the population was displaced, hundreds of people died and went missing, the economy was in ruins – altogether the state nearly collapsed. They claim, “Cyprus belongs to all Cypriots” and they feel that the best way to resolve the Cyprus issue is to encourage both ethnicities to leave behind whatever separates them to embrace and accept the other (Papadakis 113).

The Security Council resolution of March 4, 1964 defined the function of the United Nations force in Cyprus ‘in the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a reoccurrence of fighting and to contribute to the maintenance of restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions as necessary (Stephens 192). In the Greek Cypriots eyes, the purpose of the UN was to prevent a Turkish invasion of the island
and the Turkish Cypriots felt the UN’s primary function was to protect them from coercion by
the Greek Cypriots backed by Greece. In 1964, the UNFICYP was stationed in Cyprus after it
was suspected that Turkey would attack the island. This fear grew out of unsettled tension
between Greece and Turkey and their support for contending ethnic groups on the island.

When Turkey invaded the northern part of the island in 1974 the UNFICYP attempted to
protect the region. The UNFICYP continues to monitor a tense armistice in Cyprus, from which
despite UN negotiations and mediation, still remains unsettled. Furthermore, in 2004 the Greek-
speaking part of Cyprus, on its way to joining the EU, rejected Secretary Annan’s plan for unity
that had been accepted by the Turkish voters in the north (Baehr-Gordenker 68-69).

Troubled Waters

As the crisis widened in 1974, the view from Turkey was one of grave concern for the
Turkish Cypriot community. At the time, many Turks felt that US leverage was minimal.
Turkish Prime Minister, Bulent Ecevit, was deeply concerned about the rights of Turkish
Cypriots and issued a statement in July, stating the likelihood of a Turkish military reaction to
an Athens-sponsored coup in Cyprus. Henry Kissinger dispatched US Secretary of State, Joseph
Sisco, and ordered him to work out a negotiation with Evecit (Couloumbis 89). After a dramatic
meeting on July 19, Evecit icily dashed Sisco’s hopes of preventing Turkish military action and
ordered his men to attack Cyprus roughly five hours later. The Turkish forces were met by
sporadic resistance from divided Greek Cypriot regimes. The same day the UN Security
Councel kicked into action by passing Resolution 353, calling all states to: respect on another,
cease fire, immediately end foreign military intervention, withdraw, negotiate, and cooperate
with UNFICYP (Couloumbis 91). In the heat of the struggle, neither side respected the
Resolution and a de facto partition began developing in Cyprus. After two days, the Cyprus
cease fire was signed on July 22, which was followed by the collapse of the Athens junta and "micro-puppet Sampson regime in Cyprus" (Couloumbis 95). As a guarantor state of Cyprus, Greece had the right to redress the impact of the Turkish invasion because Greece had clearly indicated in the past that Turkish invasion in Cyprus would result in a Greek-Turkish war. Greece felt diplomatically and psychologically humiliated after the Turkish invasion. Drastic times call for drastic measures, so ultimately, in an attempt to diffuse Greek tension, Karamanlis decided to withdraw Greece from the military arm of NATO. Karamanlis wanted to make a point to NATO by expressing Greece’s resentment for NATO’s unwillingness to respond to the Turkish forces who attacked Cyprus. Feelings of anger and bitterness swelled in Cyprus and Greece, which led to anti-American sentiments and passionate demonstrations in front of the US embassy in Nicosia, which sadly resulted in the sniper shootings of an ambassador and a member of his staff. Demonstrators were:

“demanding sanctions against Turkey's military aggression, which had been carried out by the use of American weapons. This spontaneous, grass roots movement ultimately contributed to the congressionally imposed embargo of military aide and sales to Turkey. This embargo, in turn, fueled the rise of anti-Americanism in Turkey, as well. Thus, paradoxically, the United States emerged from the July-August 1974 crisis in a much less favorable position than all three countries” (Couloumbis 98).

From 1955-74, Cyprus was evaluated primarily from two distinct positions: The first considered Cyprus a leftover of the Ottoman Empire that was up for grabs between Greece and Turkey or both. The second position focused on Cyprus as a distinct political entity that would evolve as a bi-ethnic state who would come to develop effective constitutional structures which would be compatible with both cultures. The second position gained popularity after the July-August crisis when Greek Cypriots realized that the Greek mother-land was both ill equipped militarily
and too far physically and psychologically to come to their decisive aid. In addition, Greece also
decided that hopes of enosis were no longer practicable or possible.
Relatives of Greek Cypriots, missing since the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus, have appealed to Turkey to provide information about their whereabouts. They have requested that Turkey allow access to the archives of the Turkish army and to Turkish prisons to help investigations into the fate of the missing Greek Cypriots. Since Turkish troops invaded Cyprus and occupied the island’s northern third, the island has been divided. According to UN data, approximately 1,468 Greek Cypriots and 502 Turkish Cypriots are listed as missing from the violence.

This picture was taken in 1974 and released by the Cypriot Press and Information Office (PIO). It shows Greek Cypriot soldiers being taken as prisoners of war by Turkish soldiers who invaded Cyprus following an ethnic bloodshed that erupted in the Mediterranean island.
**Chapter 3: The Search for Peace**

“There are three ways of dealing with difference: domination, compromise, and integration. By domination only one side gets what it wants; by compromise neither side gets what it wants; by integration we find a way by which both sides may get what they wish.”

— Mary Parker Follett

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**The Green Line Revolution**

On 23 April 2003, a revolution shook Cyprus: The “Green Line”, a 220-kilometer de facto border that has divided the island since 1974, forming an almost impenetrable boundary between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities was cast open by Turkish Cypriot
authorities. By the afternoon, 1,000 Turkish Cypriots and 350 Greek Cypriots ventured to the other side at the main crossing point at Nicosia, the Cypriot capital contested between the two communities since 1963 and divided between two jurisdictions since 1974. By that evening, 3,000 Turkish Cypriots and 1,700 Greek Cypriots crossed the four authorized crossing points at the Green Line (Bose 55). United Nations peacekeeping troops watched in astonishment the commencement of a barrage of people. By 1 May 2004, 3.7 million crossings had taken place at the crossing points (Bose 57).

Cyprus’s total population is about 900,000; three-fourths are Greek Cypriots and one-fifth Turkish Cypriots. The rest are Maronites, Armenians, and other minorities (Bose 57). The frozen conflict of Cyprus was briefly launched into international headlines once again by the Green Line revolution. On 24 April 2004, exactly one year later, the UN proposed the Annan Plan for “the comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem”. The plan sought to construct the “United Cyprus Republic”, which would consist of “two largely self-governing Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot “constituent states”, supplemented by a limited central government constituted and operated on the basis of power sharing and equality between the two communities” (Bose 57). The Annan Plan was supported by 65 percent of the Turkish Cypriots but rejected by 76 percent of the Greek Cypriots. Failure of the Annan Plan left Cyprus in a state of de facto partition, expect for the permeable status of the Green Line. However, “any passage across the Line in Cyprus’s divided capital city, Nicosia, conveys the unmistakable sense of an unresolved conflict suspended in limbo” (Bose 57-58).

The ‘Green Line’, whose name originated in Nicosia during communal violence in 1958 when a British administrator drew a line on a map of the city with a green crayon to identify the “front line”, became an iron curtain of 220 kilometers running horizontally through Cyprus
(Bose 88). The opening of the Green Line and the immense public response rehabilitated hope in the international community that peace and resolution is possible even after the deadlocked UN-mediations between Cypriot leaders from just a month before. A Greek Cypriot anthropologist noted the scene of people crossing the Green Line on April 23, 2003:

“I saw some Greek Cypriots standing [as if] paralyzed at the Ledra Palace checkpoint. They stood still watching others crossing, with tears flowing down their cheeks. Perhaps it was difficult for them to believe this was happening. Perhaps they wanted to go too but felt it was not politically right. Perhaps they did not visit their old home in case it was not there [anymore]. Maybe they were worried about their own reaction if someone else now lived there. Or perhaps they were not ready yet for the encounter between their memories and the current reality” (Bose 58).

Stark Differences between Sides

News over the Green Line spread like wildfire and the surge of people between their once impassable border was the result of a very human curiosity to see the forbidden space inhabited by the ‘other’. Greek and Turkish Cypriots compared sides: Greek Cypriots admired the landscapes of the unspoiled north, while Turkish Cypriots were amazed by the designer shopping malls of the much wealthier south. Greek Cypriots flocked to casinos in the North and Turkish Cypriots traveled to horse races in the South (Bose 59).

In March 2010, two members of the Travellerspoint Travel Community, Jac and Chalky, visited Cyprus. Although they stayed in the Greek south, which is also known as Lefkosa by the Turks, they managed to cross the Green Line several times by foot. They explained that in order to cross the border they had to get stamped from both sides of the border “which was administered on pieces of paper by officials in small portable white offices; they described the territory around the Green Line to be surrounded by “empty dilapidated buildings that were
off-limits due to booby traps that still exist inside” (“Travellerspoint”). The traveling couple reported the stark contrasts of the Greek-Turkish sides noting:

“The Greek half of Nicosia was very modern, and had a high street that resembled many British ones, with Topshop and McDonalds along the street. Entering the Turkish north however, was like entering a completely new country. The currency was different (although euros still accepted) but the streets resembled those you'd find in a Middle Eastern country - less shiny and polished, but more characterful” (“Travellerspoint”)

After spending the night on the Greek side, the couple decided to take a minibus to Kyrenia (Girne) on the north coast of Turkish Cyprus, only a quick 30-minute drive over the mountain range, one that had a massive Turkish Cypriot flag painted on its side, overlooking Greek Nicosia. They admit, “It almost felt like defiant declaration to the Greeks, reminding them that the north was the domain of the Turks” (“Travellerspoint”). After arriving in Kyrenia, they described it as a “charming small cobbled town, which had beautiful harbour, brimming with boats, lined with cafés and restaurants, and watched over by the old Girne Castle”. They also described the water as very clear and blue and visible to mainland Turkey.

However, beyond the physical distinctions between sides there are also less obvious mental differences: Most of the Greek Cypriots who crossed the line at its opening were in search of the past, a life that was lost during the Turkish invasion of 1974 when Greek Cypriots were forced to abandon their families and homes and become misplaced refugees. Many Greek Cypriots visited the sites of old villages and homes and many of the Turkish families residing there welcomed their guests with food and drink. In some instances, Turkish families turned over old family albums left by the Greek Cypriot families in the rush of pressure from advancing Turkish military formations. Although, a large portion of Greek Cypriots decided against the journey in order to spare themselves the emotional pain of a lost past. Turkish
Cypriots on the other hand, crossed the Green Line in search of a better future. In a matter of weeks after the Line’s opening, “twenty-five thousand Turkish Cypriots took the opportunity to lodge applications for “The Republic of Cyprus” passports with the Greek Cypriot authorities” (Bose 60).

**Cyprus Accession to the EU and Opposition to the Annan Plan**

Cyprus is an indisputably small state when considering the three most used qualitative criteria for smallness: The population of the republic is 667,000 with about another 200,000 in the north (excluding Turkish troops but including Turkish settlers); the 2001 GDP of the republic totaled 10.2 billion and an estimated 1 billion in the north; the land area of the entire island totals 9,251 square miles. Yet, despite its small qualitative size, Cyprus has managed to attract a disproportionate amount of international attention (Nugent 4-5). Cyprus’s decision to become an EU member state has been influenced by economic reasons, the power of the EU’s emerging influence, as well as its appeal to soft security abilities (Nugent 5). Cyprus is the second smallest acceding state. According to Neill Nugent, author of *Cyprus and the European Union: The Significance of Being Small*, claims “Cyprus’s past, current, and future relations with the EU and the EU’s relations with it should not be viewed as they often are, too much through the lens of the ‘Cyprus Problem’ (concerns over ethnic divisions)”, Nugent argues that Cyprus’s smallness is a large factor in its relations and an overlooked dimension motivating its decision to seek EU membership (Nugent 19).

Cyprus was admitted into EU along with nine other countries on May 1 2004. The political roller coaster ride from 2003-2004 proved: “The challenge of forging peace turned out to be more complex and daunting than anticipated, and a lesson in the limitations of international peace-making intervention in a society deeply scarred and fissured by more than
four decades of ethnonational conflict” (Bose 58). According to author of *Ethnic Nationalism and Adaptation in Cyprus*, Neophytos G. Loizides, “Cyprus accession to the European Union inadvertently contributed to the strengthening of Greek Cypriotism and the breakdown of hegemonic beliefs emphasizing cooperation with other parties for the settlement of the Cyprus problem” (Loizides 184). However, attempts for settlement took a turn when Greek Cypriot interests became the dominant political discourse. On April 7, 2004, Cypriot president Tassos Papadopoulos, released his “emotional and polemic plea” urging Greek Cypriots to say NO to the Annan Plan (Loizides 184).

The Annan Plan proposed a loosely federal union in Cyprus in which the constituent territorial units would have maximal autonomy. It also stipulated that, “limited joint institutions would operate on the basis of consociational norms” (Bose 96). On security issues, it planned to demilitarize Cyprus. Greek and Turkish military contingents were ordered to limit their military personnel to six thousand each immediately, with another cut down to three-thousand set for 2011. A UN peacekeeping presence was also stationed to continue until at least 2010, and scheduled to be reviewed from then on. The constitutional structure of the Annan Plan was modeled on Switzerland and “remarkably similar to the confederal agreement and consociational Dayton agreement that ended the Bosnian War in 1995 and to the consociational Northern Ireland agreement reached on Good Friday in April 1998” (Bose 100). On April 24, 2004 65 percent of the Turkish population said “Yes” to the Annan Plan, however, 76 Greek Cypriots said “No”.

There are several proximate causes of the Greek Cypriot rejection of the plan: The tide of negative attitude was partially due to the way the Annan Plan was “sold” to the international community. Many Greek Cypriots also felt “railroaded and bullied” by pressure from the
international community claiming that the Annan Plan marked the “last chance for a settlement” (Bose 101). In addition, one well-known Greek Cypriot academic argued the plan would, “establish a divisive and dysfunctional system of governance… [that] legitimizes and institutionalizes the division of the island”, claiming that “its adoption is a worse option than partition”, asserting that “bi-communality should be an integral but not the exclusive characteristic of the framework for a solution [and] regarding bi-zonality, although initially there would be two states we should not exclude the possibility… of evolution into a system that would combine elements of federation and unitary states” (Bose 101-102).

Nevertheless, Papadopoulos successfully won the battle of identity by playing up glorious moments in Greek Cypriot history while demonizing Turkish piracy. He established a form of Greek Cypriot nationalism “driven by isolationism and lack of trust of the international community” (Loizides 184). In direct contrast the post-referendum elections featured Turkish leaders such as Ali Talat advertising international diplomacy. Truthfully, Papadopoulos made great play with Greek Cypriots’ commemorations of the struggle countering British colonial power in the 1950s and against the Turkish invasion of 1974. However, rejection of the Annan plan is “entrenched in the republic’s mind because of the need for security and a fear of all political risk, as well as a perception of Turkish Cypriots as competitors rather than as partners in the shared wellbeing of a re-unified island” (LMD, Kadritzke).

The Annan Plan, however you spin it, was an EU-brokered deal that overwhelming favored the Greek Cypriots. How so? Greece was promised EU membership regardless of how it voted, while Turkish Cyprus was offered admission only if both Turks and Greeks approved the deal. Therefore, since Greeks would pay no penalty for rejecting the plan they had every incentive to hold out for an even better deal. Nevertheless, the decision to admit Greek Cyprus
regardless not only spoiled the peace deal, it destroyed the credibility of the EU promises because it handed Greek Cyprus the upper hand to veto the promised moves to ease the Turkish half’s economic isolation. Finally, it affectively killed EU-NATO cooperation because NATO member Turkey refuses to recognize EU member Cyprus until the Cyprus Question is resolved, and therefore veto’s all cooperative initiatives on their end.

European Court of Human Rights Decisions in Cyprus

Since 1974 the southern Cyprus has been under the control of the government of the Republic of Cyprus, while the northern part, administered by Turkish Cypriots, proclaimed itself the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" ("TRNC") in 1983. The United States does not recognize the "TRNC," nor does any country other than Turkey. To this day, a substantial number, 35% of Turkish troops remain on the island. In a number of cases the European Court of Human Rights has found Turkey responsible for continuous human rights violations since the 1974 Turkish invasion. According to a 2010 Human Rights Report on Cyprus conducted by the US Department of State human rights violations involve:

“Reports of police abuse and degrading treatment of persons in custody and asylum seekers. Violence against women, including spousal abuse, and several incidents of violence against children were reported. There were instances of discrimination and violence against members of minority ethnic and national groups. Trafficking of women to the island, particularly for sexual exploitation, continued to be a problem, and labor trafficking was also reported” (US Department of State).

On July 22, 1989, Titina Loizidou, a Cypriot citizen, lodged an application with the European Commission of Human Rights to return her property in Kyrenia in northern Cyprus, where she owned certain plots of land. Since 1974, she had been prevented from gaining access to the above-mentioned properties as a result of the presence of Turkish forces. The application
resulted in three judgments by the European Court of Human Rights, each held Turkey responsible for human rights violations in the northern part of Cyprus. Although the Court expressed that the damages awarded were not compensation for the property, but only for the denial of the ownership and use of the property, for the fact that Titina Loizidou continues to retain full legal ownership of her property. In 2003 Turkey paid Loizidou the compensation amounts, an estimated 1 million, ruled by the European Court of Human Rights. In addition, Turkey evacuated her house for her to return, however, Loizidou has chosen not to return, claiming that Turkish occupation troops threaten her return. The Court accepted her claim. Turkey will continue to pay compensation to her for denying the right to her property.

The Mystery of Affinity and a Culture of Contentment

Over the course of the past three decades, the idea of enosis has almost disappeared from Greek discourse and apparently Athens’ endorsement of the Annan plan made no difference to Greek Cypriot outlook. At its core the same ideas still remain: That Cyprus is and has historically been a Greek island, and as the majority, Greek Cypriots should have a dominant not just an equal say in political determination. Ultimately, the provisions of the Annan Plan go against these deeply held beliefs. In the characteristic Greek Cypriot opinion: “they have never had their day in court” and this powerful widespread sense of grievance was vented in 2004 (Bose 103). The southern two-thirds of Cyprus is a successful society. The Greek Cypriot side of Nicosia resembles a wealthy town in Florida. Although the Annan Plan promised them the return of their ancient villages, many now seem to “prefer to live in a smaller, richer, safer, nearly all-Greek state than shoot the rapids in untrustworthy company on a raft engineered by Annan’s team” (Bose 103). Furthermore, Greek Cypriots understood that they would be joining the EU regardless of a settlement, therefore, “they had no counterveiling
incentive to support the Annan Plan that might just have outweighed their dominant underlying belief structure and their cultures of grievance and contentment” (Bose 103).

In April 2005, two years after opening the Green Line one year after the rejection of the Annan Plan, an era in Turkish politics comes to an end after Rauf Denktash leaves the scene. At the same time, Turkish Cypriots remain diplomatically and economically isolated. Two months later, in June 2005, UN undersecretary general for political affairs, Kieran Prendergast, toured Cyprus and met with the island’s principal leaders but concluded that Cyprus was not ready to recommence its third-party diplomacy. The Cyprus Question has yet to be answered. It is likely that settlement will be within the ill-fated UN arrangement. Until then, “the island remains uneasily suspended between an elusive formula of unification and the sword of partition” (Bose 104).

**Cultivating Unity without the Annan Plan**

While the Annan Plan strove to make everyone a winner, offering a state within a federation with good prospects for economic development, promising fled Greek compatriots indemnity payments to their lost land, and insuring the EU will continue its role in supporting peaceful development. Under the Annan Plan, Cyprus would become a federation of two constituent states—a Greek Cypriot State and a Turkish Cypriot State joined together by a single federal apparatus. The government would be based on a collective presidential council and bicameral legislature as well as a Supreme Court. Of course, as already mentioned there would also be a limited right to return between territories of the two communities. And lastly, the Annan Plan would allow both Greece and Turkey to maintain a permanent military presence on the island.
The problem with the Annan Plan is ethnic. The problem with Cyprus is also ethnic. Chapter 2 established that the Compromise of 1960—the “solution” of creating a bi-ethnic state did not actually solve anything at all. In fact, the compromise created an even more divided population than ever. It only took three years for this cacophonous and awkward arrangement to collapse. In the meantime, the remains of the 1960 Compromise inclined ethnic tensions and fumed animosities all the way up to the climax in 1974.

The Annan plan is just another example of bi-ethnic asymmetrical compromise, featuring a constitution based on protecting the major interests and expectations of each of the contending parties through a bi-communal form of government. Within this bi-communal government, the two communities would be arranged to be separated educationally, culturally, and religiously. Within the legal system, Greeks will be judged by Greek judges and Turks by Turk judges. The president of the Republic of Cyprus would always be a Greek (who will be elected separately by the Greek community) and the vice president will always be a Turk (elected separately by the Turkish community). In addition, the executive and legislative branches will be required to fill a system of ethnic quotas.

The point and case here is that nothing changes, if nothing changes. Cyprus is has established itself as an independent nation, therefore there is no need to maintain foreign military presence on the island because the threat of force will only lead each side to counterbalance each other. Fact: Greece has never owned Cyprus. Fact: The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus does not exist to anyone outside of the minds of the Turks. In addition, maintaining a bi-ethnic and bi-communal form of government only reinforces the radical appropriation and application of “otherness” within the practical domain. Dichotomizing human from human on an ethnic basis merely breeds intolerance in which both sides are likely
to deny any common cultural ground between groups so that no other group can refute the other. These ‘primordial’ claims are highly corrosive to political integration, because these claims legitimize a system of unimpeachable values and truths. Therefore, if we eliminate the option of domination of either side and we know that compromise in bi-communal terms has failed every time, then based on the simple model process of elimination, the last option left is integration.
Turkish Cypriot flag painted on the side of a Turkish Cypriot mountain range overlooking Greek Nicosia. The flag represents a defiant declaration to the Greeks as a constant reminder that the northern third is now the domain of the Turks. Turkish Cypriots refer to the north as Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus—a state not recognized by any country in the world, except Turkey.

The word ‘Enosis’ carved on the side of a Greek Cypriot mountain facing the Turkish north.
Chapter 4: Reconciling Differences in Ethnic Political Conflict

*Culture is not a biologically transmitted complex – Ruth Benedict*

*I am not Athenian or a Greek, but a citizen of the world – Socrates*

**Ethnic Affinity is Diverse in Type**

At the heart of the matter lies the mystery of affinity, the sense of belonging whether to a nation or to a people. The legal definition of French or Spanish citizenship is based on the legalities featuring only recognition of a pre-existing state of mind which is affective, sentimental, and often subconscious; this is also the way ethnic feelings exist. Another noteworthy example of ethnic affinity is provided by the Greeks. At the Versailles Conference in 1919 Venizelos explained: “A Greek is someone who speaks Greek, thinks Greek and feels Greek”. But what binds Greeks? Laurence Halley claims, “The modern Greek identifies strongly with the builders of the Parthenon, the founders of modern European thought, the organizers of the original Olympic Games. There, he believes are his roots but in fact he is of remarkably heterogeneous origin: Vlach, Macedonian, Slav, even Albanian (Halley 95). Ethnic identity is diverse in type, less uniform and generally a lower order of intensity. It has the ability to transcend frontiers because it implies no commitment to a common shared territory.

**Culture and History = Knowledge**

Culture and history are not just something created by people but that they are, to a certain extent, that which creates persons. Maurice Bloch, author of *How They Think We Think*, discusses the anthropological approaches to cognition, memory, and literacy. He examines internal and external memory and how they affect people’s views of themselves in history and
how this in turn shapes their character. He reverts back to two familiar philosophers and their folk theories of memory: Plato and Aristotle. Above all, Plato was concerned with “forms” — what he regarded as absolute transcendental truth. He believed humans, because they were humans, know everything of significance at birth. Unfortunately, they will forget their original knowledge, but through time and experience they will regain this lost knowledge. Therefore, humans may think they are learning but what they are actually doing is remembering and recalling what they already knew. Plato believed in the concept of absolute truth and he felt that it was innate in the original human condition. Aristotle, on the other hand, supposed that humans were created by the things they learned; the mind was shaped and matured through the process, compilation, and application of new and old knowledge. For him, the mind was like wax that would become permanently imprinted with new information and represented through the mind’s capacity retain and expand knowledge. According to Aristotle, when a person is trying to remember, they are merely searching for an imprint of past information that could unfortunately be overlaid by more recent memories and information, thus making older data difficult to access (Bloch 70).

The Platonist perceives particular events as overall insignificant. The human duty is to retain human identity and protect their inherent transcendental knowledge from being lost through the injuries of events. Conversely, the Aristotelian is in a permanent transformational dialectic with the world. Practical wisdom is not something absolute or finite at all but rather something continually being renegotiated; this process is inevitable, however, human experiences and learnt information will leave permanent imprints on the brain. These alternative speculations of memory are both inseparably linked to differing concepts of human nature, cosmos, and morality. Unlike Plato and Aristotle, modern psychologists and
anthropologists understand that knowledge is a complex mixture of both implicit as well as explicit knowledge (Bloch 71).

Humans tell stories about the world to help them make sense of things. The world is in turn, shaped by the narrative characteristics of these stories. There is nothing beyond the reality created in the narratives since any other past or present is simply invisible. According to Maurice Bloch,

“If people act within their own history, constructed within their own narratives, any other history is irrelevant to their action, and who are we, professional historians and anthropologists, to understand their actions and their past in any other way than in the terms of their narratives. In doing so we are merely our types of narratives for theirs and in this way carrying out some kind of intellectual imperialism” (Bloch 101).

Narratives are used to present a certain representation of the world which must be known in a way neither constructed nor transparently or completely reflected by narratives. Narratives talk in different ways about what is known; they are not knowledge itself (Bloch 110).

The Intensely Dynamic Political Quality of Ethnicity

Throughout the past decade the international system has experienced several fundamental realignments. The most obvious change has been the diminishing role of the nation-state and transnational actors. Although ethnic groups have become increasingly involved within the realm of international affairs, their role in international politics has received only periodic attention. Based on the correlation between ethno-conflict and international instability in several regional subsystems we notice the intensely dynamic political quality of ethnicity. According to Rupert Emerson and Walker Conner,
“Ethnicity is intimately related to the evolution of the nineteenth and twentieth-century state systems through the force of nationalism. It is the idea of modern nationalism that predicts the most intensely politicized dynamics of ethnic affiliations with its emphasis on “we” and “they“. Nationalism identifies a primary political and territorial community – the state with a common ethnic identity – the nation” (Stack 4).

In other words, nationalism furnaces a real or imagined sense of peoplehood or belonging that is founded on a common history, ancestry, culture, language, or region. Nationalism, therefore, is the “most visible and politicized manifestation of the phenomenon we call ethnicity” (Stack 4).

In the post-World War II era, ethnic groups were provided an unprecedented number of opportunities to enter the global system after the rise of global interdependence in: economic relations, communication systems, and transportation mechanisms. Globalization has been defined by multiple channels of political intercourse as well as a constantly shifting hierarchy of issues. Furthermore, world politics has been also complicated by inequalities regarding resource distribution, quality of life, technology, as well as industrial and economic growth.

**Ethnic Groups as Emerging Transnational Actors**

The basis of identity provides group members with a distinctive view of the world reinforced by racial, religious, linguistic, and cultural differences. Ethnicity then, is a subjective identity used to distinguish between group members and outsiders. Around the world, ethnic identity has proven to be an effective vehicle towards group mobilization. When confronting increasingly bureaucratic industrial societies, ethnic groups use utilitarian interests as a means for expressing group advantage – power, status, and wealth- within the political system. In many advanced industrialized societies ethnic groups have managed to become critical social and political players (Stack 17-19).
On an intrasocietal level, ethnic groups are reflections of an evolving transnational system. The world resurgence of ethnicity is seemingly tied to the environment in two ways: 1) through the politicization of global communication and transportation networks and 2) through accelerating patterns in political and cultural fragmentation. Thanks to remarkable technological advancements, contemporary world politics has increased the range and concentration of intergroup contacts as well as transnational linkages. Greater opportunities for transnational interaction equal greater global penetration in domestic world politics. Walker Conner suggests, “There is an inbuilt accelerator in the technological advances and other forces that causes a continuous ‘shrinking of world’ and the shrinking of states as presently defined. The frequency and pervasiveness of intergroup contacts appear fated to increase exponentially, regardless of the planner” (Stack 21). The sophistication of the global mass media serves as an effective tool for mobilization as well as survival. The television aids the process of rapid ideological and political conversion through the method of psychological immigration—a system in which artificial images and self-perceptions replace more traditional components of ethnicity (Stack 22). Ethnicity’s significance in world affairs can be credited to the politicization of transnational communication and transportation networks. Since WWII trends towards global homogenization have been accelerating. Homogenized ethnic groups tend to focus on recognizing similarities as well as differences among collectivities. Unfortunately, conflict is the likely result of this mentality. In Idols of the Tribe, Isaacs explains:

“This fragmentation of human society is a pervasive fact in human affairs and has always been. It persists and increases in our own time as part of an ironic, painful, and dangerous paradox: the more global our science and technology, the more tribal our politics; the more universal our system of communication, the less we know what to communicate; the closer we get to other planets, the less able we become to lead a tolerable existence on our own; the more it becomes apparent that human beings cannot decently survive with their separateness, the more separate they
become. In the face of an ever more urgent need to pool the world’s resources and its powers, human society is spitting off into smaller and smaller fragments” (Stack 24).

**The Adaptive Nature of Ethnicity**

Ethnic identity is considered to be a self-concept rather than something assumed to be fixed or certain. They are fluid, socially constructed concepts established through territorial boundaries and group formation. Ho-Won Jeong explains, “Particular claims for group rights and privileges are inherent in identity politics; given their contingent and adaptive nature, identities can be reinvented and reconstructed” (Byrne and Irvin 121). In the end, ethnic identifications are internally and externally constructed and formed in relation to the outside world.

**How Can Anthropology Help?**

Anthropology addresses deep ontological questions: Where did we come from? What is our nature? Why do we behave the way we do? What are the prospects for our future? What does it mean to be human? The word, anthropology, literally translates to the study of humankind. Anthropology is based on a macroscopic perspective that focuses on understanding the pasts of specific cultures and observing the reoccurring patterns that affect the present. It is a study that embraces both the biosocial diversity as well as the uniformity of humanity (Fry xiii).

It is a natural human tendency to think in terms of the present “here and now”. However, many of the challenges of humanity in the 21st century demand a broader perspective. Much of the violence observed in ethnic political conflict today stems from people defending their rights or attempting to correct injustices. Anthropological and historical cases
demonstrate that violent means of justice seeking can be replaced by effective nonviolent approaches: This is the key for creating and maintaining peace. Anthropology contributes to the understanding of war and peace by challenging conventional ways of thinking about war, peace, security, and injustice – all concerns for everyone living on this interdependent planet, where we all breathe the same air and share the same threat of death through a nuclear winter (Fry xv). According to cultural anthropologist Ruth Benedict, the purpose of anthropology is to make the world safe for human differences. She explains, “No man ever looks at the world with pristine eyes, he sees it edited by a definite set of customs, institutions, and ways of thinking” (BrainyQuote).

**Peace Building in Identity Driven Conflicts**

The inherent awareness of a distinctive national identity accompanied by a perception of the incompatibility of interests fashions the growth of nationalistic manifestations. Peace building in identity driven conflicts is a matter of negotiating social values through a large social network. Ho-Won Jeong, explains how ethnic groups can remain passive and immobilized for a long period of time; Interestingly, “Owing to the combined phenomena of rising expectations and relative deprivation, a sense of entitlement rises faster than is fulfilled for ethnic groups” (Byrne and Irvin 115). Basically, mobilization in one community will commonly activate counter-mobilization by others. Ethnic groups who claim cultural rights and status are a perceived threat to the expectations and interests of neighboring communities. The management of ethno-political conflict revolves around defining the ethnic agenda. Negotiation, compromise, and accommodation are keys to peaceful coexistence; however, they are the “results of hard bargaining though political processes that may not eliminate conflict but prevent the competition from erupting into destructive violence” (Byrne and Irvin 116).
Typically, ethno-conflict is far too complex to be resolved rationally. Commitment to a nation is not equally matched with loyalty to the state. A forced attempt for national integration will most likely result in ethnocide, as was the case when several post-colonial states made an effort to coercively assimilate a poly-ethnic civilization into a territorial nation state system.

According to the neoliberal political model political, development derives from a strong central government capable of reshaping ethnic loyalties, individual identity, and group structure. The territorial concept of nationality is founded on the establishment of modern, bureaucratic, centralized states. The state is responsible of resolving ethnic conflict in a neoliberal model of peace building. The neoliberal model is based on a pluralistic political system in which people are granted civil rights and conflict is controlled through the expansion of economic resources. State institutions aspire to create a single political culture in which ethnic differences are traded for a single civic identity and ethnic values are the replaced by needs and aspirations that can be managed by the state. The creation of a national political center, such as democracy, is a means to transform identity through the promotion of civic identity. However, the ambitions of the state are much easier said than done (Byrne and Irvin 117-118). The idea that plainly differentiated positions can be compromised through the establishment of a single constitution is not an easy mission when multicultural issues are not confronted with particularism and alternatively swept under the rug. Ethnic politics in late modern conditions have become considerably more alienated and marginalized. In many societies, the state is an instrument of supremacy by privileged ethnic groups who participate in a form of cultural despotism (Byrne and Irvin 119).

Are Conflict and Aggression Synonymous?
American anthropologist, Douglas P. Fry, defines conflict as “a perceived divergence of interests – where in – interests are broadly conceptualized to include values, needs, goals, and wishes – between two or more parties, often accompanied by feelings of anger or hostility” (Fry 11). He defines aggression as “the infliction of harm, pain, or injury on other individuals (verbal or physical)”, however his point is that conflict need not involve and aggression whatsoever. Conflict and aggression are not synonymous. He claims that, “Although violence may be one of the most noticeable and destructive ways of dealing through which people handle conflict, a close examination of cross-cultural data reveals that people usually deal with conflicts without violence” (Fry 11). In his book, *The Human Potential for Peace: an Anthropological Challenge to Assumptions about War and Violence*, he addresses five major approaches to conflict management.

Unilateral and bilateral approaches include:

1) Avoidance – disputants cease to interact or limit their interaction either temporarily or permanently.

2) Toleration – the issue in dispute is ignored as the relationship is simply continued.

3) Negotiation – disputants interact to form mutually acceptable compromises or solutions. Negotiation often involves the giving and accepting of compensation.

4) Self-redress – (a.k.a. self-help and coercion) one disputant takes unilateral action in an attempt to prevail in a dispute or to punish another.

5) Settlement – (the trilateral approach) third party deals with a dispute. Settlement can take several forms: friendly peacemaking – third party simply separates or distracts disputants; mediation – third party facilitates negotiation process; arbitration – third party renders a decision, but lacks the power to enforce it; adjudication – third party renders a decision and has the power to enforce it; repressive peacemaking – third party uses force or threat to stifle a dispute (Fry 23).
Certainly violence part of the human profile, but it is only a small part. A balanced view of human nature recognizes the immense human capacity for limiting and dealing with conflict without reverting to force.

**The Geopolitics of Emotion**

In 1993, political scientist Samuel Huntington was praised for his book, *The Clash of Civilizations*, which predicted that the fundamental source of conflict in the post-Cold War world would not be ideological or economic but cultural. Dominique Moisi, a leading authority on international affairs, claims that our post 9/11 world has is divided by more than cultural fault lines. Moisi depicts geopolitics today as a “clash of emotions”, focusing on how cultures of fear, humiliation, and hope are reshaping the world.

Historically, geopolitics have been based on rational, objective data concerning territory, economic resources, hard-line military power, and the overall cold political calculus of interest. By contrast, emotions have been considered essentially subjective, if not entirely irrational. Moisi bases his book, *The Geopolitics of Emotion*, on a dual conviction: 1) One cannot fully understand the world in which we live without trying to integrate and understand its emotions. 2) Emotions are like cholesterol, both good and bad. The difficulty is to find the right balance between them (Moisi x). Moisi claims, “Fear against hope, hope against humiliation, humiliation leading to sheer irrationality and even sometimes, to violence – one cannot comprehend the world in which we live without examining the emotions that help to shape it” (Moisi xi).

Do emotions represent cultural tendencies of particular regions and populations today? Do these varying emotions influence the political, social, and cultural conflicts in our world
today? There was a time when international affairs scholars tactfully discounted the importance of emotions. Global politics was reserved for a special caste of elite professionals, who treated the world like a game of chess. States and governments were expected to act rationally. Emotions were therefore contained because they were predicted to add additional irrationality to an already disordered world. But of course, emotions are not easily contained. They always surface, or burst, with a vengeance. Moisi says,

“Today we shall see, quests for identity by peoples uncertain of who they are, their place in the world, and their prospects for a meaningful future have replaced ideology as the motor of history, with the consequence that emotions matter more in a world where media are playing the role of a sounding board and a magnifying glass” (Moisi 4).

Whether they are religious, ideological, national, or purely personal, emotions have always mattered. It is impossible to understand the course of history by failing to account for the crucial influence of emotions.

In his book, Moisi focuses on three primary emotions: fear, hope, and humiliation. All three emotions are linked closely with the notion of confidence, which he believes is the defining factor in how nations and people handle challenges and communicate with one another. Moisi explains,

“Fear is the absence of confidence. If your life is dominated by fear, you are apprehensive about the present and expect the future to become ever more dangerous. Hope, by contrast, is an expression of confidence; it is based on the conviction that today is better than yesterday and that tomorrow will be better than today. And humiliation is the injured confidence of those who have lost hope in the future; your lack of hope is the fault of others, who have treated you badly in the past. When the contrast between your idealized and glorious past and your frustrating present is too great, humiliation prevails (Moisi 5).
Therefore, confidence is a major factor in determining world health and it is just as important on a national scale as it is on an individual level. Confidence can be mapped through a series of indicators which scientifically measure the degree of trust of a population in its own future through spending patterns, levels of investment, birthrates, even architecture, art or music (Moisi 6).

In the age of globalization, emotions have become indispensable to the comprehensibility of our increasingly complex world. Moisi explicates, “Identity is strongly linked with confidence, or lack thereof, and expressed though emotions – in particular those of fear, hope, and humiliation” (Moisi 13). Whereas the ideological atmosphere of the twentieth century was defined in terms of conflicting political models: capitalism, fascism, and socialism. Today, ideological conflicts focus on the struggle for identity; it is important to assert one’s own individuality in a globalized world where everyone and everything are so interconnected. Moisi notes, “In a world dominated by identity, we are less defined by our political beliefs and ideas than by our perception of essence, by the confidence we gain from our achievements and the respect we receive from others or by the lack thereof” (Moisi 14). Emotions are reciprocal – they are the image in the mirror and the eye of the person who beholds that image. Whether you fear someone, feel humiliated by someone, or hope to be like someone, emotions are mutually dependent and critical to understanding our identity dominated world. Moisi says,

“An element of fear is necessary for survival, and hope ignites and fuels the motor of life. Even humiliation in very small doses can stimulate one to do better… But deliberate humiliation without hope is destructive, and too much fear, too much humiliation, and not enough hope constitute the most dangerous of all possible social combinations, the one that leads to the greatest instability and tension (Moisi 15).
According to the present, governing scientific mood of academic circles, emotion is inherently too “soft”, subjective, and indefinable, to hold any real meaning or value. This attitude is understandable. The increasing complexity of the world today drives the inclination to analyze the international system through the distanced prism of a scientific or pseudoscientific approach. In many of the world’s most prestigious universities, quantitative analysis theories are applied to international relations, but big questions regarding human behavior are ignored. Even on the most basic level, the “soft”, subjective realities of emotion matter.

Human Capabilities

Martha C. Nussbaum has paid a great deal of consideration to the aspects and implications of culture and social development. Ultimately, she feels that culture has developed an affinity with local members and an unbridgeable alien ‘otherness’ with members outside this realm. Instead of focusing on what makes us different from others, we must recognize that we all share inherently the same human aspects. Nussbaum set forth to reveal ‘the central human capabilities’: How human life can be defined based on shared interests and practices. “We recognize other humans as human across many differences of time and place, of custom and appearance” (Nussbaum and Glover 73). What do we consider as characteristic of human life? Nussbaum names eleven universal dimensions we all share on a biological level:

1) Mortality – all human beings share aversion to death.

2) Human body – the experience of the body and the importance we ascribe to its various functions may be culturally shaped. Yet the body itself is not culturally variant physical requirements such as hunger, thirst, the need for protection/shelter, sexual desire, and mobility.
3) Capacity for pleasure and pain – humans are sentient beings subject to both experiences. Interestingly, the aversion to pain as a fundamental evil is a primitive end and it appears to be an unlearned part of being a human animal.

4) Cognitive capability: perceiving, imagining, thinking – humans all have the ability for sense perception, to make their own distinctions, think, imagine, and attempt to understand.

5) Early infant development – humans all began as helpless babies who experience extreme dependency, need, and affection.

6) Practical reason – all humans share the capacity to participate in the planning and management of their own lives, and the ability to draw their own conclusions based on what they know.

7) Affiliation with other human beings – humans live in relation to others and define themselves in terms of the ties they make and keep.

8) Relatedness to other species and to nature – universal understanding that humans are not the only living things occupying Earth and in turn, are aware that there is a ‘complex interlocking order that both supports and limits them’.

9) Humor and play – human life to some extent always makes room for recreation and laughter. Lack of it is taken as a sign of deep disturbance.

10) Separateness – each human is ‘one in number’, proceeding down a different path that continues from birth to death. Each person is subject to only their unique sentiments and experiences. In addition, ‘each person dies without logically entailing the death of anyone else’. Even the most intense acts of human interaction (sexual experience) never result in fusion’.

11) Strong separateness – realization of the individual nature of life developed through self-identification (Nussbaum and Glover 76-80).

Beyond the biological level of the conceptual human being, Nussbaum claims that humans share functional capabilities as well such as: the preservation of life; the opportunity to have good health; the ability to avoid unnecessary and non-beneficial pain; the capability of
utilizing imaginative and cognitive senses; attachment to people and things outside of self; 
Conception of well-being and self-interest and critical reflection in planning one's own life; 
desire to laugh, play, and enjoy life; ability to recognize and show concern for human beings 
through various forms of social interaction; as well as the capacity to live with and care for 
animals, plants, and the natural world; ability of living one's own life and no one else's. With 
the guarantee of non-interference with certain choices that are personal and definitive of self-
hood (Nussbaum and Glover 83-85).

Cultural Complexity, Moral Interdependence, and the Global Dialogical Community

International problems such as ethnic political conflict require worldwide 
communication and effort in order to reach an effective solution. According to Seyla Benhabib,

"Among the most disheartening intellectual developments of the last two decades is the irony that the world has 
grown together and the globe become unified to a hitherto unprecedented degree, our theoretical discourse has 
turned local, contextualist, parochial, and has shied away from thinking globally and reflecting about principals of 
planetary interdependence" (Nussbaum and Glover 235).

Benhabib regards cultural relativism as a ‘poor man’s sociology’. She claims that supporters of 
cultural relativism defend their beliefs based on the assumption that the ‘reflexivity of cultures 
and the drive towards legitimation’ are invasive ‘western elements’ and the western 
epistemologist must rather assume the position and attitude of the bemused, detached observer 
with the mentality of ‘we do not need to scratch where it does not itch’. For Richard Rorty, the 
concept of self-understanding is illusory. He feels that questioning the norms and values of 
one’s own culture is critical in grasping the bigger picture: There is something larger than the 
community and culture that represents the individual – humanity which has intrinsic nature 
(Nussbaum and Glover 242). Since the Enlightenment, people have been torn between
allegiance to one’s own context and moral ideas humanity and international solidarity.

According to Benhabib, many cultures have been moved by a belief in the human community that at in some circumstances felt closer to them than their own local community. She explains, “Most of us today are members of more than ‘one’ community, one linguistic group, one ethnos. Millions of people the world over engage in migrations, whether economic, political, or artistic. Every Western nation state in Europe is currently dealing with multi-cultural and multi-national pressures (Nussbaum and Glover 243).
Conclusion: Do Good Fences Make Good Neighbors?

You can’t say the fence is not intrusive – Robert Gross

We may have all come in on different ships, but we’re in the same boat now – Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.

Using Barriers to Deal with Conflict

The term interface barrier or ‘peaceline’ generally refers to barriers that have been built in response to concerns for safety and security in the interface area (Jarman 22). Barriers are erected as a means of controlling and restricting the association of people in an effort to improve levels of security and safety. According to conflict researcher, Neil Jarman:

“Barriers have increasingly been seen as a way of controlling movement in many parts of the world. These include barriers that have been built between countries and within cities, with the aim of controlling immigration, reducing crime or violence, increasing a sense of security, and also to restrict movement and exclude the unwanted...beyond making a symbolic statement, and in many cases, the barriers have become a target of violence, as they often serve to indicate the presence of a hostile, unwanted or unseen ‘other’ on the other side” (Jarman 24).

Perhaps the most famous wall of modern times: the Berlin Wall was used to divide sections of the city. In 1989 the wall was extensively celebrated as it was breached as part of the collapse of the Soviet Union. In a similar fashion, the “Green Line” was established in Cyprus following the Turkish invasion and occupation of the northern half of the island in 1974. The Green Line was used to divide the capital city of Nicosia into its Greek and Turkish sectors. The decision to open the main Ledra Street crossing has been regarded as one step in the right
direction towards reunification of the island. Despite the widespread criticism of the use of walls since the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961, barrier construction used to ‘solve’ social problems has been on the rise (Jarman 25). The two most high profile controversial walls currently under construction include the US-Mexican border and the Israeli government structure being erected around the West Bank to restrict the movement of the Palestinians. Lesser known barriers exist in many other locations. Some include borders between Saudi Arabia and Yemen, Morocco and Algeria, and between the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla and Morocco (Jarman 25). Nevertheless, all attempts to build barriers that segregate along racial and ethnic lines have regularly attested to be contentious and provocative. Jarman explains:

“In general constructing a barrier is a way of marking intent. It acknowledges a problem and indicates some desire to respond to it, albeit in a limited and conservative manner. While physical structures may provide some short term palliative to a social or political problem, they also provide a challenge to human ingenuity and persistence. Thus in the long term the problems will have to be addressed by other means, through debate, dialogue, negotiation, and some form of political process. Unfortunately once they are erected barriers tend to be enveloped by a sense of inertia and caution and they are difficult to get rid of” (Jarman 26).

In a recent study, Jarman explores people’s attitudes towards the possible removal of interface barriers in Belfast. One series of questions explored people’s understanding of walls and the purpose they served: 51% felt they were to ‘stop the fighting, trouble, etc., 15% felt they were there to ‘stop rioting’, 39% believed they were erected to ‘keep the two sides apart/segregation’, and 10% felt they were around to provide a sense of protection, while only 2% believed they were not needed and should have never been put up (Jarman 28). The survey
also studied people’s attitudes towards the possible removal of walls. Overall, residents were willing to see the walls removed, but not necessarily immediately. Most people believed that they walls did serve some purpose in reducing acts of violence, most agreed that they violence would not result in anything more than minor or occasional acts of violence, there was also limited confidence in the ability of the police force to preserve peace without physical barriers as a last resort. Interestingly, people also noted that while walls provided some security, they also managed to uphold tensions and antipathy between communities. In addition, people felt that local politicians “used the walls to play on people’s fears”, Jarman explains, “A majority felt that the politicians should do more to create the conditions for the walls to come down, and the removal of barriers would also lead to an improvement in community relations” (Jarman 30). Jarman’s research on the perception of barriers in Belfast, “although limited in scope”, usefully identifies people’s concerns and also highlights possible ways to advance the debate. Key factors would include: more positive efforts from politicians, more diverse and effective regeneration of interface areas and more cross-community dialogue (Jarman 31).

While the barrier might well provide some sense of security and safety to the residents of Cyprus it also reinforces, quite obvious, ongoing divisions and territoriality that continues on the island. Therefore, barriers endure as a “reminder of how far we still have to go in the process of establishing a ‘normal’ society”, thus Jarman expounds: the sooner residents of interface communities begin engaging in dialogue and discussion to identify how, when, and in what circumstances the barriers can finally start to be removed.

The ‘Cyprus Question’

The tiny island of Cyprus is located in a region characterized by fierce nationalism where ethnic identity plays an important part in day-to-day politics and has even become
politically institutionalized through different systems on germane national or regional levels. The case of the Cyprus Question is a prime example of how ethnic groups have made cultural claims to cite ancestral homogeneity. At the heart of the Cyprus Question lies the mystery of affinity. Of all the emotionally charged episodes of ethnic conflict that have plagued the twentieth century, Cyprus was chosen as the case study of this work because it addressed the primary theoretical issues the world has witnessed in ethnic political conflict today; Issues of memory, self-definition accompanied by conception of other, nationalism, as well the use of ethnic claims, grounded in the myth of common ancestry, as political weapons to legitimize as communicate demands.

As a species of collectivity, the ethnic group manages to lucratively combine symbolic as well as instrumental reasoning to clothe practical interests and rivalries in the garb of antiquity, authenticity, and kinship—not to say that it is a lie, only a translation. Most ethnic groups define and characterize themselves based on a real or supposed common history. The myth of common history is often a remote or improvable history as we see in the case of Cyprus. The struggle on Cyprus between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots didn’t begin until nationalism reared its ugly head subsequently after the Greek War for Independence. Prior to that there would have been no ‘Greater Greece’ for Cyprus to unite with. The notion of a ‘Greater Greece’ stems from the fact that Cyprus has been subjected to a history of conquest and foreign rule by whatever power controlled the seaway at the time. With no glorious history of their own the Greek Cypriots wished to unite with Greece through the process of enosis so that they too could have access to the same historical symbols and celebrated culture. What the struggle for enosis generated much fervor and vehemence among Greek Cypriots because for them it represented an identity crisis. Union with Greece was their attempt to seek, assemble,
protect, and advance their identities. When their efforts for enosis failed, Greek Cypriots pushed for independence from Britain instead. While, Cyprus managed to gain its independence, the outcome was far from liberating. Given the ethnic tensions on the island, the UN produced the Compromise of 1960, a bi-ethnic compromise that featured a plan for a bi-communal form of government under one federal apparatus. The “Compromise” acknowledged the two groups almost independently of each other; this both intensified competition as well as eliminate almost all incentive to work together. Eventually, tensions on the island came to a boil and in 1974, Turkey in fear for her Turkish Cypriot minority on the island, decided to invade Cyprus, murdering, displacing, and pushing Greek Cypriots to the southern half of the island where they have resided since. In an effort to improve levels of security and safety, an interface barrier was installed that UN officials refer to as The Green Line. However, almost forty years later the Green Line still stands. While measures were taken in 2003 to open crossing points, the wall still serves as a physical reinforcer of ethnic differences on the island.

**Is There an Answer to the ‘Cyprus Question’**

While many historians try to find out what happened, most anthropologists would rather concentrate on showing the ways in which historical accounts are used as tools in the contemporary creation of identities in politics and stressing the importance of history not as a product of the past but as a response of the requirements of the present. Ethno-political conflict revolves around defining the ethnic agenda. Negotiation, accommodation, and cooperation are keys to peaceful coexistence; however, they are the results of hard bargaining that can’t eliminate conflict but will certainly keep it under control.
The answer to the Cyprus Question does not lie in a consociational compromise or bi-communal form of government. The point and case here is that nothing changes, if nothing changes. If insanity means doing the same thing over again and expecting different results, then Western leaders must be certifiably insane. Just as the bi-ethnic Compromise of 1960 led to the widened crisis of the 1974 Turkish invasion, another identical ‘solution’ such as the Annan Plan would also lead to increased tensions as they have in the past.

In addition, Cyprus is has established itself as an independent nation, therefore there is no need to maintain foreign military presence on the island because the threat of force will only lead each side to counter-balance each other. Fact: Greece has never owned Cyprus. Fact: The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus does not exist to anyone outside of the minds of the Turks. In addition, maintaining a bi-ethnic and bi-communal form of government only reinforces the radical appropriation and application of “otherness” within the practical domain. Dichotomizing human from human on an ethnic basis merely breeds intolerance in which both sides are likely to deny any common cultural ground between groups so that no other group can refute the other. These ‘primordial’ claims are highly corrosive to political integration, because these claims legitimize a system of unimpeachable values and truths. Mary Follett states it beautifully,

“There are three ways of dealing with difference: domination, compromise, and integration. By domination only one side gets what it wants; by compromise neither side gets what it wants; by integration we find a way by which both sides may get what they wish.”

Therefore, if we eliminate the option of domination of either side and we know that compromise in bi-communal terms has failed every time, then based on the simple model
process of elimination, the last option left is integration. However, any forced attempt for national integration will be problematic and destructive.

Greece has decided that previous hopes of enosis were no longer practicable or possible. Since 1974 Turkish Cypriots have been economically depressed (after inheriting economic problems from the mainland). Greek Cypriots, on the other hand have been prospering financially. Turkish Cypriots stand to gain economically through reintegration not only in the overall economic prosperity, but also by avoiding the economic isolation from the rest of the world that their current non-recognized status entails. Likewise, the Greek Cypriots stand to gain in terms of recovering territory, lost homes, and property (Couloumbis 112). According to US President Bill Clinton, “We all do better when we work together. Our differences do matter, but our humanity matters more”. Although ethnicity does harness an intensely dynamic political quality is it also equally (if not more) adaptive in nature. Ethnic identities are fluid, socially constructed concepts that are formed internally and externally in relation to the outside world. Instead of focusing on what makes them different, the polarized population of Cyprus must recognize that as human beings we all share inherently the same human aspects. Self-understanding is illusory. Questioning the norms and values of one’s own culture is critical in grasping the bigger picture.

Again, ethnic conflict is far too complex to be resolved rationally. According to Moisi, one cannot fully understand the world we live in without trying to integrate and understand its emotions. He claims that confidence is the major factor in determining world health. He explains that it is just as important on a national scale as it is on an individual level — Identity is strongly linked with confidence or lack thereof. Confidence, he says, can be mapped through a series of indicators which scientifically measure the degree of trust a population possesses in its
own future through spending patterns, levels of investment, birthrates or surveys (similar to the one Neil Jarman conducted in Belfast). A simple measure of confidence in Cyprus should be the first step taken towards removing the Green Line.

Ultimately, the Cyprus problem is not going to vanish overnight but steps must be taken to cultivate unity rather than division of the island through the use of interface barriers and bi-communal compromises. The reunification of Cyprus must include: more positive efforts from politicians, more diverse and effective regeneration of interface areas, more cross-community dialogue, as well as ‘confidence mapping’. Historically, Cyprus and its people have always been at the mercy of the dominant power in the area because it has been considered too small to exist by itself. Cyprus has been bought and sold, transferred from ruler to ruler without the inhabitants ever being consulted. As a result, Cypriots have fallen victim to an extremely turbulent past. However, the political disasters since its independence in 1960 have been largely self-inflicted. Therefore, the Cyprus Question can only truly be answered by the Cypriot people, with the help of leaders who understand that when we compete we get some of it back; when we cooperate we get it all back.
"Our ability to reach unity in diversity will be the beauty and test of our civilization." - Gandhi
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